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ABSTRACT 
 
This thesis consists of three empirical studies in economics of education on the determinants and 
consequences of language-in-education (LiE) policies. The “Environmental settings – Inputs – 
Processes – Immediate outcomes – Long-term outcomes” (EIPOL) evaluation model is applied to 
LiE policies and programs and serves as the overall framework of this research (see Introductory 
Chapter). Each study then targets at least one stage of the EIPOL framework to test the validity of 
the “green” vs. “free-market” linguistic theories. Whereas the two first studies derive models tested 
empirically in the African context, the third is tested on a sample of countries from the 
International Adult Literacy Survey (IALS).   
The first study, Rationales to Language-in-Education Policies in Postcolonial Africa: 
Towards a Holistic Approach, considers two issues. First, it explores the factors affecting the 
choice of an LiE policy in 35 African countries. The results show that the countries adopting a 
unilingual education system put different weights on the influential parameters than countries 
adopting a bilingual education system and that both groups of countries validate somehow both the 
“green” and the “free-market” approaches. Second, the article investigates how decision makers 
can ensure the optimal choice of language(s) of instruction by developing a non-cooperative game 
theoretic model with network externalities. The model shows that it is never optimal for two 
countries to become bilingual, or for the majority linguistic group to learn the language of the 
minority group, unless there is minimum cooperation to ensure an equitable redistribution of 
payoffs. This finding confirms the “free-market” theory. 
The second study, The Role of Language in Learning Achievement: A amibian Case 
Study, investigates the role played by home language and language proficiency on  mathematics 
scores of 5048 Grade-6 learners in 275 Namibian schools, via the second survey data by the 
Southern and Eastern Africa Consortium for Monitoring Educational Quality (SACMEQ). 
Hierarchical linear modeling is used to partition the total variance in mathematics achievement into 
its within- and between-school components. Results of the analysis show that although home 
language plays a limited role in explaining within- and between-school variations in mathematics 
achievement, language proficiency, when proxied by reading scores, plays a significant role in the 
heterogeneity of results. Thus,  confirming the role of language skills in learning achievement and 
so validating the “green” theory.  
 Finally, the third study, Language Skills and Economic Returns, investigates the economic 
returns to language skills, assuming that language competencies constitute key components of 
human capital. It presents results from eight countries enrolled in the International Adult Literacy 
Survey (IALS). The study finds commonalities between countries in terms of the valuing of 
language skills, independent of the type of language policy applied at the national level. In each of 
the eight countries compared, skills in a second language are estimated to be a major factor 
constraining wage opportunities. This study validates the “free-market” theory. 
 
 
Descriptors: Language-in-education policies, decision making analysis, non-cooperative game, 
language skills, hierarchical linear modeling, human capital theory, rate of return analysis, post-
colonial Africa, IALS, SACMEQ 
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ITRODUCTIO 
 
The dominant monolingual orientation is cultivated in the developed world and 
consequently two languages are considered a nuisance, three languages uneconomic and 
many languages absurd. In multilingual countries, many languages are facts of life; any 
restriction in the choice of language is a nuisance; and one language is not only 
uneconomic, it is absurd (Pattanyak, 1984; quoted by Skutnabb-Kangas & Garcia, 1995, p. 
221). 
 
1. General Framework of the Thesis 
 
The present thesis builds upon the paradoxical position endorsed by the education sector as 
a mediator between two opposite linguistic theoretical approaches. On the one hand, the 
“green” theory of ecological protection claims that endangered languages should be 
protected by all means respecting linguistic human rights. On the other hand, the “free-
market” theory advocates for a homogenization of the market’s communication tools to 
facilitate trade in globalized markets (Kibbee, 2003)1.  
 It is in this complex ideological environment that education policies have to define 
which language(s) should be selected as media of instruction within the classroom. 
Answering that question is of course not straightforward since the type of language-in-
education (LiE) policy adopted by a government reflects its social, cultural and economic 
ambitions.  
The present thesis adopts a holistic approach to the choice of LiE policies by 
suggesting the consideration of both the rationales and the consequences of an LiE option 
in the decision making process. Such an approach enables the constructive confrontation of 
the two theoretical linguistic schools by highlighting their complementarities rather than 
their oppositions. More concretely, this thesis opts for the “Environmental settings – Inputs 
– Processes – Immediate outcomes – Long-term outcomes” (EIPOL) grid of evaluation 
suggested by Bhola (1990). Within this grid, environmental settings aim at providing 
information on the settings to be able to make planning decisions; inputs aim at making 
programming decisions such as alternative project designs and personnel decisions;  
process aims at making decisions related to methodologies and implementation; immediate 
                                                 
1 For more details about the tenants of this debate, see Study III. 
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outcomes cover learning outcomes and other intermediary outcomes of the program; and 
long-term outcomes cover the long-term effects of the program on the educational and 
socio-economic domains (ibid.).  
The environmental settings are here defined according to Lewis’ (1980) 
classification in terms of diffusion variables, setting variables and mobility variables and a 
distinction is made between private and social outcomes (or benefits) with respect to the 
principles of the human capital approach. 
As Figure 1 displays, this classification enables the inclusion of all the dimensions 
necessary for the evaluation of an LiE policy, and constitutes therefore an ideal structure 
for the design of this thesis’ overall conceptual framework. The theoretical assumptions 
grounding this framework are presented in each of the three studies compiled for this 
thesis: Study I – Rationales to Language-in-Education Policies in Postcolonial Africa: 
Towards a Holistic Approach; Study II – The Role of Language in Learning Achievement: 
A Namibian Case Study; and Study III – Language Skills and Economic Returns. 
Each of the three studies targets specific levels of analysis of this framework. For 
instance, Study I targets explicitly the environmental settings, inputs and process levels. In 
turn, Study II, by addressing the role of languages in the learning achievement of Namibian 
grade-6 pupils, targets the private immediate outcomes dimension. Finally, Study III 
targets the social immediate outcomes and long-term private outcomes of the framework.  
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Figure 1 General Framework of the Thesis 
Note: a. Social welfare designates civic involvement, democratic empowerment, social cohesion, etc. 
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2. Aims and Objectives of the Research 
 
The overall objective of this thesis is to investigate the determinants and consequences of 
LiE policies in the frame of the theoretical debate opposing the “green” and the “free-
market” theories, to identify which level of evaluation each theory serves best. It is 
assumed that neither of the two approaches is sufficient to explain all the levels of 
evaluation identified in Figure 1. Rather, it is believed that either approach can be validated 
as optimal from a decision-making point of view according to which level of analysis is 
identified as the priority by the decision maker.  
This potential complementary nature of the two theories is tested by each study 
within this thesis. More specifically, each study aims at answering the following questions: 
 
Study I:  
A. How much do environmental settings affect the nature of LiE policies in 
postcolonial Africa?  
A conceptual and theoretical framework is developed based on sociolinguistics literature 
and tested empirically on 35 African countries with ordered logistic regression (see Tables 
A and B in Annexes). The main hypothesis is that in some countries, internal factors (e.g., 
behavioral, community-type and institutional settings) might have a larger impact on the 
number of languages retained as media of instruction than external factors (e.g., financial 
and economic dependency, colonial history and openness to external ideologies). If so, the 
“green” theory is expected to be validated. In the opposite case of a comparatively stronger 
position of external factors the “free-market” is expected to be validated. 
 
B. What is the optimal decision for a LiE policy-maker?  
A non-cooperative game with network externalities is developed to inform this issue. The 
assumption is that the most optimal LiE policy ranks the language of the majority group 
first as the medium of instruction. This implies that the “free-market” theory should be 
validated unless a cooperative approach is adopted by the players of the game. 
 
Study II: 
A. How much do pupils’ linguistic characteristics affect mathematics 
achievement compared to some other individual and structural parameters?  
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A hierarchical linear model (HLM) is developed and tested on Grade-6 Namibian learners, 
controlling for within- and between-school variations. In this model, the assumption is that 
mathematics achievement is facilitated by language proficiency, which is itself facilitated 
by mother-tongue instruction. The “green” theory is therefore expected to be validated by 
this model. The data used are all issued from the Namibian SACMEQ II survey but the 
modeling process results mainly from non-quantitative observations gathered upon two 
short field visits to Namibia in December 2003 and April-May 20042. 
 
Study III: 
A. Does proficiency in the official language(s) play a significant role on wages? 
B. Are language skills more rewarded in countries applying an official bilingual 
policy than in countries applying another type of language policy? 
An empirical human capital model is developed to elucidate both questions controlling for 
gender and immigration status. The assumptions are, first, that language skills are expected 
to have a positive impact on wage opportunities and, second, that the reward of language 
skills are higher in countries implementing a bilingual LiE policy. These assumptions are 
tested using the International Adult Literacy Survey (IALS) for eight countries. In this last 
study, the “green” theory is expected to be validated if wage opportunities are positively 
affected by language skills in non-international or dominant languages, and if the second 
assumption is true. Otherwise, the “free-market” theory will be validated.  
 
3. Main Findings 
 
Study I’s first model shows that of the 35 countries considered, the countries adopting a 
unilingual education system weigh differently the environmental parameters than countries 
adopting a bilingual education system. For instance, multilingual policies appear positively 
influenced by both external settings and community-type settings, and negatively 
influenced by institutional settings and degree of openess. 
These results neither validate or invalidate the hypothesis in favor of the ”green” vs. 
”free-market” theory, which demonstrates that both theoretical approaches may be of equal 
validity when addressing Bhola’s (1990) three first levels of evaluation (i.e. environmental 
settings, inputs and process).  
                                                 
2 See acknowledgements in Study II. 
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Study I’s second model confirms the hypothesis in favor of the ”free-market” 
theory by demonstrating that it is never optimal for two countries to become bilingual in 
one another’s language, or for the majority linguistic group to learn the language of the 
minority group, unless there is minimum cooperation to ensure an equitable redistribution 
of payoffs. 
In turn, Study II suggests that although home language plays a limited role in 
explaining within- and between-school variations in Namibian pupils’ mathematics 
achievment, language proficiency (proxied by reading scores) plays a significant role at 
both levels of analysis, thus supporting the significant role of language in learning 
achievement. This study confirms the hypothesis in favor of the ”green” theory. 
Finally, Study III reveals commonalities between the eight countries of the sample 
in terms of language skills valuying, independent of the type of language policy, 
confirming the hypothesis that the higher the second language skills the higher the wage 
opportunities. However, this positive effect of language skills on earnings is only observed 
for skills in an international or dominant language, which confirms the ”free-market” 
theory at the expense of the ”green” theory. 
 
4. Definitions and Delimitations of the Research 
 
Among the terms recurrently used in this study and grounding its raison d’être are 
‘language-in-education policy’, ‘bilingual education policy’, ‘bilingual skills’, ‘value’ of 
bilingual skills, and ‘literacy’. Although the theoretical background of each concept is 
depicted in the following studies, a short definition of each term is presented to avoid any 
lexical confusion and to delimitate the scope of the study. 
The term ‘language-in-education (LiE) policy’ is, throughout this dissertation, used 
to refer to the third element of language planning, named by Cooper (1989) as ‘acquisition 
planning’. According to language policy theories, ‘language planning’ corresponds to the 
activity – most visibly undertaken by governments because of the massive changes it 
involves in a society – that aims at changing the linguistic behavior of a speech 
community. On the other hand, ‘language policy’ refers to the “body of ideas, laws, 
regulations, rules and practices intended to achieve the planned language change in the 
society, group or system” underlying the actual language planning process (Kaplan & 
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Baldauf, 1997, p. xi)3. Language planning consists of three elements: status planning, 
corpus planning and acquisition planning. The two first derive from Kloss’ (1969) addition 
to Haugen’s (1966) Model of language planning, and the third was later introduced by 
Cooper (1989). Kloss (1969) defined corpus planning as concerned with the internal 
structure of the language, and status planning as the efforts undertaken to change the use 
and function of a language within a given society. Cooper (1989) later added acquisition 
planning to cover the efforts to spread and promote the learning of a language. Because 
most of these efforts are monitored by the education system, ‘acquisition planning’ is also 
called ‘language-in-education policy’ (see Study I for a detailed classification of language 
policies and LiE policies). 
Note that countries are classified in this work in terms of their ‘official’ LiE policy 
with no effort made to verify whether the policy is actually implemented or not. This 
delimitation constitutes a limitation, which could have been overcome with a rigorous 
qualitative investigation in absence of time or budget constraints. This limitation should be 
taken into consideration in the interpretation of the results.   
Further, the definition of bilingual education retained for this dissertation (in Study 
I and Study III) is the one offered by Fishman (1979), in which, “[i]n very general terms, 
bilingual education implies some use of two (or more) languages of instruction in 
connection with teaching other than language per se” (p. 12). Consequently, bilingual 
education policies are the programs using two or more languages of instruction. A 
bilingual person is, in turn, defined as one whose linguistic ability in two languages is 
similar to that of a native speaker (Malmkjær, 1991).  
 Moreover, the concept of value as applied to language competences refers to the 
theory of utility-value according to which the value of a good depends on the utility that 
consumers estimate the good will provide them. Thus, the utility-value theory defines the 
link between the usage value and the exchange value, which is the market price. In the case 
of education, the value reflects the objective preferences of the actors for that activity 
above other activities, and the price is no more than the translation of these preferences in 
monetary terms in the context of scarcity at a given place and time (Grin, 1999, p. 33).  
                                                 
3 “‘Language policy’ may be realized at a number of levels, from very formal language planning documents 
and pronouncements to informal statement of intend (i.e. the discourse of language, politics and society) 
which may not at first glance seem like language policies at all. Indeed, …, policy statements tend to fall into 
two types – symbolic and substantive, where the first articulates good feelings toward change (or perhaps 
ends up being so nebulous that it is difficult to understand what language specific concepts may be involved), 
and the latter articulates specific steps to be taken” (Kaplan & Baldauf, 1997, p.  xi). 
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 The value of language can be given a market or non-market, private or social 
equivalent. The private market value of competences in second languages is defined by 
wage differentials, which fall to the share of individuals in possession of these 
competences. This study is especially interested in net differentials that is, the wage gaps 
between individuals that are unequal in terms of their level of possession of linguistic 
competences, but similar in terms of age or professional experience. The estimation 
methods are presented in Study III. Further, the private non-market value targets the 
satisfaction directly felt by the practice of activities enabled by certain language 
proficiency. The social market value is the sum of private market values, moderated by 
positive or negative externalities. Finally, the social non-market value is the aggregation of 
private non-market values collected at the individual level. However, despite the obvious 
worth of non-market and social market values, the complexity of the collection of 
comparative data on such values compelled this study to limit its analysis solely to market 
values of second language competences. 
Furthermore, the definition of literacy used in this study is the one adopted by the 
IALS, according to which literacy is a mode of adult behavior (see Study III for the 
rationale behind this definition). Overall, literacy consists in “[u]sing printed and written 
information to function in society, to achieve one’s goals, and to develop one’s knowledge 
and potential” (Statistics Canada, 2002, p. 15).  
Beyond the above lexical specifications, it is important to mention that the general 
complexity embedded in language issues requires from any research on these matters a 
certain interdisciplinary research method. In the present case, although the research 
questions adhere to the fundamental positivist economic paradigm, references to 
sociolinguistic, political, educational and linguistic concepts are judged necessary to 
capture the manifold dimensions of the topic. Following Grin’s (1999, p. 3) argument, the 
method adopted here is therefore applied interdisciplinarity (or “interdisciplinarity by 
articulation” as defined by Coenen-Huther, 1989) rather than methodological 
interdisciplinarity (as defined by Wallerstein, 1989; 2004, as part of his world-systems 
analysis4).  
                                                 
4 Against the dissection of social phenomena in separate independent academic disciplines, such as politics, 
economics, sociology, and culture studies, the world-systems analysis claims the need for a holistic historical 
social science. Originally, the ambition of this perspective was to broaden the loci of analysis in the 
following way: “World-systems analysis was an attempt to combine coherently concern with the unit of 
analysis, concern with social temporalities, and concern with the barriers that had been erected between 
different social science disciplines” (Wallerstein, 2004, p. 16). This implies the analysis of materials from 
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Finally, due to the relatively recent development of the consideration of languages 
in economic terms, and hence, the consequent scarcity of empirical demonstrations of its 
impact on education, it should be underlined that this study defines itself more as a 
tentative and explorative study than as a demonstration of definite or well established 
findings.   
 
5. Significance of the Studies 
 
In view of the above delimitations and limitations, the significance of this work lies mainly 
in its effort to address LiE policy issues within a holistic and interdisciplinary frame of 
analysis at an international comparative level. In so doing, this study hopes to improve 
political decision-making and implementation practices at several levels. First of all, 
understanding the construct rationales to LiE policies, their outcome in term of learning 
achievement, and the status of languages for the international labor market, can provide 
necessary information to help policy makers and international donor agencies evaluate LiE 
policies in a more holistic, and hence efficient, perspective.  
Such contribution falls well into the demands for interdisciplinarity raised by 
several sociologists, linguists and sociolinguists, who recommended integrating linguistic 
analysis as part of the peoples’ and nation states’ economic, political and cultural 
development (Goke-Patriola, 1993; and Mackey, 1992). They hoped this would avoid the 
emergence of an educational hegemony built on the exclusive cultural, political and 
economic positions of the schools (Apple, 1990; Williams, 1976), which had already led to 
the rise of elitist systems, such as described by Bourdieu (1991) in occidental countries, 
and witnessed by Goke-Patriola (1993) in postcolonial countries.  
Secondly, all the studies of this thesis belong to the broad category of quantitative 
multilevel analysis. Studies I and III are classic inter-country analyses and Study II is an 
inter-pupil and inter-school analysis. As underlined by Bray & Thomas (1995), the 
importance of multilevel analysis for certain types of inquiry is an increasingly recognized 
                                                                                                                                                    
multiple disciplines, for example history, economics, political science or sociology, within a single analytical 
frame. Therefore, Wallerstein specifies that “The resulting world-systems analysis was not multidisciplinary, 
since the analysts were not recognizing the intellectual legitimacy of these disciplines. They were being 
unidisciplinary” (p. 19). Hence, this unidisciplinarity can be understood as resulting much more from a 
methodological ‘interdisciplinary’ quest than from ‘multidisciplinarity’. 
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fact5. However, they claim that too many studies lack an international dimension or a 
multilevel dimension within a national framework. A decade later, this weakness persists 
and the present study hopes to overcome these traditionally observed weakness by 
attempting to combine different units and levels of analysis in each study. For instance, by 
comparing the results of the environmental factors analysis among 35 countries, Study I 
adds an international-level to the initial country-level analysis. In turn, Study II 
investigates both pupil and school levels within the Namibian framework and Study III 
lifts up the traditional human capital return analysis to an international dimension.  
Finally, the results of this research have the capacity to challenge the attitudes at 
the microeconomic (individuals and firms) and macroeconomic (public) levels towards 
language skills. For instance, among the hypotheses6 tested in this work, the validation of 
the hypothesis that “the higher the level of bilingual skills, the higher the wages” tested in 
Study III has the potential to support private and public efforts to develop competencies in 
languages, either through bilingual education policies or other vocational education and 
training options, if the environmental settings necessary for their construction and 
implementation are gathered. On the other hand, if this hypothesis had been invalidated by 
this study it could have led to the questioning of the worth of bilingual education policies 
and promoted unilingual education policies7 or even no LiE policy at all. The significance 
of this study lies therefore also in its capacity to address the interests of the stakeholders 
involved in this debate, namely decision-makers, entrepreneurs, teaching staff and 
students.  
 
6. Limitations of the Studies and Recommendations for Further Research 
 
Among the three studies of this thesis, two make use of international educational 
achievement or literacy studies: the second survey from the Southern African Consortium 
on Monitoring and Evaluation of Education Quality (SACMEQ II survey) is used in Study 
                                                 
5 See, for instance, Burstein (1980; 1988); Cronbach (1976); Goldstein (1987); Raudenbush & Willms 
(1991). 
6 In this dissertation, the terms hypothesis and assumption are used as synonyms. 
7 Policies of promotion of the official language, also called ‘unilingualism’, consist in promoting a single 
language at all levels of the society, i.e. political, legislative, social, economic, educational, etc. They can 
promote the dominant language, in which case it is the national language when it has acquired the status of 
official language, or a colonial language of international diffusion. Although these policies only recognize 
one language, minority languages can still beneficiate from certain linguistic rights (Leclerc, 2006).  
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II; and the International Adult Literacy Survey (IALS) in Study III. It is important to 
underscore the limitations of such datasets. As explained by Beaton, Postlethwaite, Ross, 
Spearritt & Wolf (1999), such international studies have the advantage of compelling 
participating countries to subject their curricula to close scrutiny. They can alert ministries 
to differences between their curricula and that of other countries, in terms of emphasis 
given to different subject areas for instance. However, the weakness of these studies is the 
misinterpretation that may result from such comparisons. Differences among countries do 
not necessarily imply any deficiency of curricula, rather the adoption of a particular 
curriculum may be justified by the state of development of a country’s education system.  
Furthermore, the nature of the variables derived from such surveys does not allow 
for in-depth analyses of the tenants of within- and between-countries variations. Hence, 
any result should be supplemented by further field study analyses before deriving any 
policy recommendations. Besides, as an outsider to the data collection process, the 
researcher analyzing these data is subject to ‘ecological fallacy’ [i.e. conclusions drawn 
from the erroneous assumption that a relationship established at one level of aggregation 
(e.g., among countries) holds at any other level of analysis (e.g., among students within 
countries)]. For the same reason, sampling error bias and endogeneity issues are also 
common fallacies encountered by empirical works based on such datasets. Rather than 
resolving them, the present research has put emphasis in attempting to account for these 
issues. 
Beyond the general weaknesses embedded in large international survey data, it is 
worth emphasizing the limitations suffered by the empirical applications of all three studies 
due to lack of data on language background and language skills at an international level. 
This lack of data has resulted in the use of challenging proxies which weaken the impact of 
the findings. For instance, Study I bases its empirical test solely on data arbitrarily recoded 
(see Tables A and B in the Annex section of this thesis for a detailed overview of the 
information grounding the computation of the data used in Study I)8; Study II makes use of 
a seriously questionable dummy variable to define pupils’ home language status; and, in 
absence of informative data, all the studies make the challenging assumption that the 
official LiE policies of the sampled countries are actually implemented in all schools. 
Similarly, the lack of longitudinal studies at the international level addressing the issues 
                                                 
8 These two tables were removed from the version of Study I submitted to the Economics of Education 
Review (reproduced in this thesis with authorization from Elsevier) to comply with the format imposed by 
the journal. They are annexed to this thesis for transparency and clarification reasons. 
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raised in this thesis limited the interpretation scope of the results tremendously. These data 
pitfalls need to be addressed by further international survey designers and researchers.   
Finally, this research did not include any analysis of the social returns to language 
skills nor of the impact of language skills on economic development. These two 
dimensions would of course need to be accounted for to complete the holistic evaluation 
framework presented in this introduction. Such analyses are therefore strongly 
recommended for further research. 
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Abstract 
 This article considers two issues regarding language-in-education (LiE) policies in 
the African postcolonial context. First, it explores the factors affecting the choice of a LiE 
policy. In that effort, the literature from the sociolinguistics is reviewed towards the design 
of a conceptual and theoretical framework identifying the different influential parameters 
on LiE policies. That framework is then tested empirically on 35 African countries. The 
results show that the countries adopting a unilingual education system put different weights 
on the influential parameters than countries adopting a bilingual education system. Second, 
the article investigates how the decision makers can ensure an optimal choice of 
language(s) of instruction by developing a non-cooperative game theoretic model with 
network externalities. The model shows that it is never optimal for two countries to 
become bilingual, or for the majority linguistic group to learn the language of the minority 
group, unless there is minimum cooperation to ensure an equitable redistribution of 
payoffs.  
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1. Introduction 
The globalization of the debate around language policy options emerged at the end 
of the Second World War as an indirect consequence of the major economic and social 
recession that reached as far as the participating countries’ economic partners and colonial 
territories. In the early 1960s, occidental economists – among whom Schultz, Becker, 
Mincer, Weisbrod and Denison – started to study the elements affecting the capacity of 
production of human beings and their effect on production. Analyzing the quantitative and 
qualitative characteristics of a population (e.g., health, migrations, information and 
education) as production factors implied incorporating their contribution to economic 
growth into a production function. These works led to the theorization of human capital, 
which received major echoes in the political occidental world and it became soon 
commonly admitted that the pursuit of education leads to individual and national economic 
growth. This new approach aroused the interest of governments to analyze the causes of 
the human skills deficit characterizing most post-war economies. Consequently, large 
literacy assessment surveys were developed, especially in North America, and international 
campaigns for universal literacy1 were launched in most developing countries.  
These efforts have led to different explanations of human skills deficit, among 
which one of the most recurrent is the fact that the education of indigenous peoples and 
minorities in large parts of the world has so far been organized in direct contradiction to 
our best scientific knowledge of how it should be organized (Skutnabb-Kangas, 2001). 
More specifically, the assumption that literacy is limited to a single language is particularly 
pernicious, because of its political, social and educational implications (Kaplan & Baldauf, 
1997, 146).  
In order to understand what motivates most governments around the world to opt 
for such language policies, it is important to keep in mind the economic stimuli that lay 
behind. Language policy and planning2 is primarily an outgrowth of the positivist 
economic and social paradigms which dominated the 1950s and 1960s. As a result, “most 
of the motivation for language planning, during its early development as a discipline in the 
                                                 
1 In this context, ‘literacy’ refers to the ability to deal with written text – both to encode and decode it. In 
other words, literacy consists of the set of skills, required by any given society, of individuals who wish to 
function above the subsistence level. Unequivocally, the teaching of literacy has passed over time to the 
professional education sector, whose main function is to ensure the dissemination of an appropriate literacy 
through the population (Kaplan & Baldauf, 1997: 143-145). 
2 Originally designated ‘language engineering’, the discipline emerged as an approach to articulating 
programs (usually in newly independent ‘developing countries’) for ‘language problems’ solving (Kaplan & 
Baldauf, 1997, xi). 
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1960s and 1970s, was socio-political and focused on nation building, primarily using the 
nineteenth century European model of one state, one language, one culture, regardless of 
how inappropriate such a model might have been for the new emerging multilingual 
polities” (Kaplan & Baldauf, 1997, 153).  
The consequences of this political orientation were dramatic. Nyati-Ramahobo 
(1999) argues that the recurrent underachievement that characterizes African education 
systems and continues to exclude many children from economic performance ensues from 
the use of a foreign language as medium of instruction. In Van Dyken’s (1990) words, “the 
[African] continent’s limited literacy is related to the degree to which the mother tongue 
has been ignored in favor of the international colonial languages” (Van Dyken, 1990, 40). 
Nowadays, it is widely admitted that the adoption and elevation of an African language to 
“official status” constitutes a positive step for literacy (Bhola, 1981; Kagan, 1982; Ouane, 
1990), identity building, cultural reaffirmation and group identity, thereby for democracy; 
and the existence of a positive relationship between literacy in local languages and 
economic growth is well recognized. More generally, language is today commonly viewed 
as a special commodity necessary for national and international development and 
communication (see, for instance, Jernudd, 1981; Baldauf & Jernudd, 1983; Jernudd & Jo, 
1985; Swales, 1985; and Kaplan & Baldauf, 1997).  
In view of the spectacular evolution that has taken place in the contextual settings 
for the decision-making of language planners over the past decades, several African 
countries have moved from unilingual planning to multilingual approaches. Yet, still today, 
among the 2011 languages (i.e. 30 percent of the world’s languages) counted for the 56 
African Nation-States, only 14 have an official status, of which French still dominates in 
23 countries, English in 19 countries, Portuguese in 5 countries, and Spanish (including 
Canary Islands) in 2 countries (Grimes, 2000; Leclerc, 2006). Hence, in view of the 
remaining dominance of colonial languages with official status, the rationales behind this 
evolution of choice remain obscure. 
This paper aims, therefore, at lifting the shade on the rationales ruling decisions on 
language-in-education (LiE) policies in post-colonial Africa. In that effort, this paper 
divides this issue into two sub-issues: (1) What are the most influential factors affecting the 
decision process of African policy makers? (2) How can a policy maker choose the most 
privately and socially optimal subset of languages of instruction? 
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To answer the first question, a conceptual framework is designed building on 
findings from sociolinguistics (section 2), which is then tested empirically on 35 African 
countries selected on the basis of the availability, reliability and comparability of their data 
(section 3). Finally, to answer the second question, a game-theoretical model is developed 
(section 4). This paper deviates from previous research mainly by its cross-disciplinary 
theoretical and methodological frameworks.  
 
2. Conceptual framework 
2.1 Conceptualizing language-in-education (LiE) policies 
 
In order to understand what language-in-education policy embeds it is essential to 
understand the terms ‘language planning’ and ‘language policy’. On the one hand, 
‘language planning’ is an activity – most visibly undertaken by governments because of 
the massive changes it involves in a society – that aims at changing the linguistic behavior 
of a speech community. On the other hand, ‘language policy’ refers to the “body of ideas, 
laws, regulations, rules and practices intended to achieve the planned language change in 
the society, group or system” underlying the actual language planning process (Kaplan & 
Baldauf, 1997, xi). Hence, “the exercise of language planning leads to, or is directed by, 
the promulgation of a language policy by government (or other authoritative body or 
person)” (ibid.).  
The term ‘language planning’ includes both structural (‘form’) and contextual 
(‘function’) aspects of language planning (Haugen, 1966 and 1983) and differentiates 
between ‘corpus planning’ and ‘status planning’ (Kloss, 1969). Whereas corpus planning is 
concerned with the internal structure of the language, status planning3, in contrast, refers to 
all efforts undertaken to change the use and function of a language (or language variety) 
within a given society (Mesthrie, Swann, Deumert & Leap, 2000, 385). More recently, two 
additional dimensions of language planning have been identified, namely ‘acquisition 
planning’ (Cooper, 1989) and ‘prestige planning’ (Haarmann, 1990). Whereas acquisition 
planning covers the efforts to spread and promote the learning of a language mainly 
through language-in-education planning, prestige planning is directed towards creating the 
favorable psychological background necessary for a sustainable success of the language 
                                                 
3 Usually the term ’status’ is used to mean ’rank’, ’(social) position’ or even ’prestige’. Kloss, however, uses 
the term as a synonym of ‘function’ or ‘domain’ (Mesthrie et al., 2000, 418). 
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planning activities (Mesthrie et al., 2000). Interested specifically in the use of language as 
medium of instruction, i.e. LiE policies, this paper retains ‘acquisition planning’ as the 
third dimension of language planning (after corpus and status planning) and deliberately 
ignores Haarmann’s prestige planning. 
Even if LiE planning takes place at only one level of the language planning process 
(i.e. acquisition planning), its efficiency depends on its ability to proceed interdependently 
with the other two dimensions of the system (i.e. the corpus and status planning). Hence, 
the legitimacy of a LiE planning requires first the existence of a national language planning 
and then the adoption of a LiE policy. In return, all decisions taken at the educational level 
should be reported to the national language planning organ.  
 
2.2 Rationales to LiE policies 
 
In 1974, Fishman commented on the necessity to add to the language policy 
analysis even the most technical aspects of language planning in a social context as “there 
are always habits and attitudes and values and loyalties and preferences, not only in the 
target populations, but among the planners themselves” (Fishman, 1974, 19). Fishman’s 
(1974) argument is supported by many critical linguists, such as Garvin (1974) and Joseph 
& Taylor (1990), for whom language issues can not be addressed without considering their 
relationship with power and ideology. Hence, because language planning process is 
affected by social variables such as attitudes, power and authority relationships, as well as 
ideologies, a language policy should integrate factors such as the viability, historical 
presence, geographic importance and demographic and political status of the language(s) 
involved. Indeed, as Mackey (1992) stresses, the making of a language policy is not a mere 
academic exercise, but more often a practical response to social, economic and political 
pressures.  
In his analysis of the relationship between hegemony and curriculum, and referring 
to Williams (1976), Apple (1990) explains that the interrelationship between all these 
variables is related to the existence of a strong hegemonic power in all educational 
policies. Schools do not only process people, they process knowledge as well4. They act as 
agents of cultural and ideological hegemony, in Williams’ words, as agents of ‘selective 
tradition’ and of ‘cultural incorporation’, helping to create people with the meanings and 
                                                 
4 This idea has been defended by most British sociologists. See, for instance, Young (1971).  
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values required by the economic environment. As a consequence, the socially ‘legitimate’ 
knowledge taught in schools depends on the school’s cultural, political and economic 
position (Apple, 1990, 6-7). Applied to language-in-education, this hypothesis can be 
illustrated by the sustainable relative power of colonial languages in African education in 
favor of the promulgation of elite status.  
As Goke-Patriola (1993) highlights in the context of post-colonial states in Africa, 
“one of the things which educational systems do is to define the ‘legitimate language’” and 
as a consequence “all other varieties of speech are subject to sanctions which are either 
externally imposed (by the authorities and the reality of the market, for example) or they 
are self-imposed” (p. 97). This can be explained by what Bourdieu (1991) refers to as ‘the 
laws of the transmission of linguistic capital’, which have the following consequences: 
 
As a linguistic market strictly subject to the verdicts of the guardians of legitimate culture, the 
educational market is strictly dominated by the linguistic products of the dominant class and tends to 
sanction the pre-existing differences in capital. The combined effect of low cultural capital and the 
associated low propensity to increase it through educational investment condemns the least favored 
classes to the negative sanctions of the scholastic market, i.e. exclusion or early self-exclusion induced 
by lack of success… those least inclined and least able to accept and adopt the language of the school 
are also exposed for the shortest time to this language and to educational monitoring, correction and 
sanction (Bourdieu, 1991, 62).  
 
In addition to this internal hegemony, Goke-Patriola (1993) highlights the influence 
of external hegemony and power in African societies, characterized by economic, cultural 
and psychological dependency on foreign culture and powers. This external dependency is 
largely favored by the inherited educational systems and their LiE policies.  
Alongside this global understanding of the construct of LiE policies, Lewis (1980) 
explains that the significance of bilingualism and bilingual education5 is determined by its 
relation to the ‘total structure’ of political, economic and religious institutions. Within this 
total social structure, differences in language can occur, led by, or leading to, a complex 
system of heterogeneities in the formulation of bilingualism and the implementation of LiE 
policies. Lewis (1980) identifies the nature of linguistic heterogeneity using the following 
sets of variables: 1) diffusion variables, 2) setting variables, and 3) mobility variables (see 
Figure 1).  
                                                 
5 If we understand bilingual education as the use of two or more languages as media of instruction, then 
bilingualism and multilingualism become synonymous. This amalgam is used throughout this paper. 
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This classification has the advantage of covering all the factors and dimensions 
highlighted by the literature reviewed above. By weighting each set of variables for a 
sample of ten countries applying official bilingual education programs, Lewis’ (1980) 
study was the first of its kind to offer an international comparative picture of the 
determinants of bilingual education policies. In this paper we adapt this classification to 
any type of LiE policy.  
The combination of all these environmental settings influences the choice of 
language policy and in turn, of LiE policy, which can range from multilingual education 
programs to unilingual education programs (see Figure 2 for a classification of language 
policies and corresponding LiE programs based on the definitions by Leclerc, 2006; 
Trueba, 1979; and Skutnabb-Kangas & Garcia, 1995). Whereas unilingual education 
programs consist in the use of one single language as medium of instruction, usually the 
national language or majority language, multilingual education programs imply the use of 
two (or more) languages of instruction in connection with teaching other than language per 
se (Fishman, 1979).  
Figure 1 summarizes these contributions into a concept map6 serving as a reference 
framework within which the findings of the present investigation will be examined, 
quantified and interpreted. The inter-concept relationships are ruled by the sociolinguistic 
theories presented in this section. Figures 1 and 2 show that the environmental settings 
defined by Lewis (1980) have an impact on the nature of the language policy which in turn 
defines the LiE policy. The LiE policy can then be implemented by bilingual or unilingual 
programs according to the orientation of the language policy. The environmental settings 
are composed of three sets of variables: (1) diffusion variables; (2) setting variables 
(composed of behavioral, external, community-type, institutional and historical settings); 
and (3) mobility variables.  
 The first set of variables is ‘diffusion variables’, which refers to the influence of 
international practices on the provision of bilingual education in a given country. Although 
Lewis (1980) defines diffusion variables in terms of increase of inter-nation 
communication, he does not specify the nature of these diffusion variables. Therefore, in 
the current study, we choose to define Lewis’ concept of ‘diffusion’ as a synonym of 
policy borrowing or lending. In her book The Global Politics of Educational Borrowing 
                                                 
6 This concept map was designed using CmapTools, which is a software environment developed by the 
Institute for Human and Machine Cognition (IHMC).    
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and Lending, Steiner-Khamsi (2004) alongside other educationalists analyzes the effects of 
globalization on education in terms of ‘borrowing’ and ‘lending’ of education policies. She 
defines the concept of ‘borrowing’ as “what can be learned and imported from elsewhere” 
and the concept of ‘lending’ as “what can be taught and exported to elsewhere” (ibid, 1-2). 
In this context, diffusion can be understood in terms of degree of openness to new political 
inputs. A proxy indicator of such openness is the Index of Economic Freedom which takes 
into account ten different types of freedoms ranging from trade freedom to investment 
freedom. If a country presents a high degree of freedom then we assume that its openness 
for import or export of education policies will be high. 
The second set of variables identified by Lewis (1980) targets the ‘settings’ of 
bilingual education policies, i.e. the historical, institutional, behavioral, external, and 
community-type settings. These ‘settings’ embody “the differences in the immediate 
context of the provision of bilingual education in different countries or for different ethnic 
groups within a single country” (ibid., 6). More specifically, historical settings can be 
determined by the study of historical antecedents such as colonization. They help 
identifying the chances of national acceptability of any kind of bilingual education among 
succeeding generations. Moreover, institutional settings cover the rules and measures 
developed by political institutions to guarantee the implementation of bilingual education. 
Here, we adapt this definition to the needs of our study by measuring institutional settings 
in terms of the relevance of the languages chosen for instruction to the needs of the labor 
market, where the more common languages between the education sector and the labor 
market the more positive the expected effect of the institutional settings. Furthermore, 
behavioral settings reflect the way in which systems behave towards target groups of 
bilingual education, rather than the way in which students, teachers, or parents, behave. For 
instance, Lewis shows that a comparative study may reveal whether causal relations exist 
between the demand for bilingual education (emphasizing the vernacular) and levels of 
economic advance and types of educational philosophy adhered to. He shows that in the 
case of the United States economic advances are correlated to the homogenization of 
education systems, including the homogenization of LiE policies. In the African context, 
however, this type of homogenization has proven to be instead correlated to the colonial 
era, which is not a sign of economic development. Therefore, we decide instead to 
understand behavioral settings as the efforts made by the African authorities to implement 
bilingual programs that incorporate mother-tongue instruction. In turn, external settings 
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have to do with a country’s relationship with other states, far and near. For instance, 
external settings include commercial and financial dependency towards other states. Then, 
community-type settings characterize the type of bilingual community for which bilingual 
education is thought desirable, with an emphasis on geographical situation (isolated 
communities, enclaves, bounded communities, and segregated communities). However, in 
this paper, we define community-type in terms of scope of applicability of the LiE policy 
(for all vs. for a specific group).  
Finally, the third and last set of variables identified by Lewis (1980) is ‘mobility 
variables’, which depict movements within and across linguistic, ethnic and national 
boundaries. Movements can be classified into two main types according to their within or 
across national boundaries nature: nomadism and seasonal migration or commuting, and 
voluntary vs. involuntary migration. All these types of migrations may have different 
effects on the nature of languages (i.e. corpus planning) and language needs (i.e. status and 
acquisition planning). However, Lewis added this category in the context of occidental 
countries. In the African context, it does not bring in anything specific, since all the 
countries have been similarly positively influenced by such flows of populations. We, 
therefore, treat this parameter as a constant and not as an explicative variable.  
The objective of this section was to review the contributions of the sociolinguistics 
to our research question. What emerged from this review is the fact that sociolinguistics 
provides specifically strong insights into the influence of a combination of pedagogical 
rationales and powerful contextual social, economic and political forces on decisions about 
medium of instruction (Tollefson & Tsui, 2004). Nevertheless, sociolinguistics could not 
provide for deeper analysis of the explicit mechanisms characterizing the identified 
relationships. The methodological tools necessary for such inquiry (i.e. for the 
quantification of the above mechanisms) are instead to be found in the positivist economic 
paradigm.  
 
3. How much do environmental settings affect the nature of LiE policies in 
postcolonial Africa? 
 
This section aims at quantifying the relationships identified in Figure 1. In that 
effort, 35 African countries have been selected based on the availability, reliability and 
comparability of their data. These countries are Angola, Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, 
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Burundi, Cameroon, Central Africa (Republic of), Congo-Brazzaville, Congo-Kinshasa, 
Cote d’Ivoire, Egypt, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea-Bissau, Kenya, Lesotho, Libya, 
Mali, Mauritania, Morocco, Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, 
Sierra Leona, Swaziland, Tanzania, Togo, Tunisia, South Africa, Zambia, and Zimbabwe.  
The empirical model estimates an ordered logistic regression, where the 
independent variable is the type of LiE policy adopted, defined as four categories: 0. 
unilingual policy; 1. bilingual (excluding mother-tongue instruction); 2. bilingual 
(including mother-tongue instruction); 3. trilingual. This formulation gives equal weight to 
all categories. It orders the different types of LiE policies from the weakest to the strongest 
category of multilingual policies (see Trueba, 1979 and Skutnabb-Kangas & Garcia’s, 
1995, classifications of multilingual programs presented in Figure 2).  
The explanatory variables are defined as follows7: 
 L is a count of the number of languages that the schools can officially choose among as 
media of instruction. 
 E measures the external settings, i.e. a country’s relationship with other states, far or 
near. It is defined as the proportion of linguistic commonalities with the exportation 
and importation main partners, and the main bilateral donor. Here, we assume all the 
languages to have the same weight. The linguistic commonality takes values ranging 
between 1, when all the languages of instruction are common to the languages of the 
main export partner (or main import partner or main bilateral donor), and 0 if none of 
the languages of instruction is common to any of the languages of the main partner.  
 C is the community-type settings, i.e. the type of language ideology applied, namely 
pluralism, vernacularization, assimilation, separatism or internationalization (see 
previous section). It takes the value of 1 if it is designed to cover the whole school 
population (e.g., assimilation/integrative approach) and 0 if it only targets a distinctive 
community or a non-compulsory level of education (e.g., separatism approach, such as 
Apartheid). 
 I covers the institutional settings, i.e. the rules and measures developed by political 
institutions to guarantee the implementation of bilingual education. It is defined as the 
proportion of languages taught in school that are common to the languages spoken on 
the labor market. This variable is used as a proxy of the capacity of the LiE policy to 
respond to the linguistic needs of the labor market. The value of I ranges between 1, if 
                                                 
7 See Annexes A and B for a detailed outline of the sources of computation of these variables. 
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all the labor market languages are taught in school, and 0, if none of the languages of 
the labor market are offered by the education system. 
 H refers to the historical settings, i.e. the colonial influence on the LiE policies. It is 
defined as the portion of colonial languages in the total number of languages of 
instruction defined in the LiE policy. 
 D measures the diffusion variables, i.e. the influence of external practices on the 
provision of a type of LiE policy. This parameter is measured by the 2006 Index of 
Economic Freedom, which measures and ranks 161 countries based on their overall 
percentage of freedom calculated across 10 specific freedoms equally weighted. These 
freedoms are business freedom, trade freedom, monetary freedom, freedom from 
government, fiscal freedom, property rights, investment freedom, freedom from 
corruption and labor freedom. This index is a good proxy of the degree of openness of 
a country to new ideas and practices8.  
 
From our theoretical framework, we expect a negative sign for the L, I, H and D 
estimates and a positive sign for E and C. In other words, we expect that the higher the 
weight of L, I, H and D the higher the probability that the country will opt for a unilingual 
policy; and reciprocally, the higher the weight of E and C the higher the probability for the 
implementation of a multilingual policy. 
Among the thirty-five countries of our sample, ten are Francophone unilingual9, six 
are English-speaking unilingual10, four are Arabic-speaking unilingual11, three are 
Lusophone unilingual12, one is solely Francophone and English-speaking13, one is solely 
Francophone and Arabic-speaking14, six are bilingual in English and a national language15, 
two are bilingual in French and a national language16 and two are trilingual (in at least 1 
                                                 
8 For more details about the computation of the Index of economic Freedom see 
http://www.heritage.org/index/ 
9 The 10 Francophone unilingual countries of the sample are Benin, Burkina Faso, Congo-Brazzaville, 
Congo-Kinshasa, Cote d’Ivoire, Gabon, Mali, Niger, Senegal and Togo. 
10 The 6 English-speaking unilingual countries of the sample are Botswana, Gambia, Ghana, Nigeria, Sierra 
Leona, Zambia.  
11 The 4 Arab-speaking unilingual countries of the sample are Egypt, Libya, Morocco and Tunisia. 
12 The 3 Lusophone unilingual countries of the sample are Angola, Guinea-Bissau and Mozambique. 
13 The only solely Francophone and English-speaking country of the sample is Cameroon. 
14 The only solely Francophone and Arab-speaking country of the sample is Mauritania.  
15 The 6 countries bilingual in English and a national language are Kenya, Lesotho, Namibia, South Africa, 
Swaziland and Tanzania. 
16 The 2 countries bilingual in French and a national language are Burundi and Central Africa. 
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national language)17. The gathered information is coded using the principles for each 
parameter outlined above and displayed in Table 1. The data sources used to compute 
Table 1 are the CIA (2006) World Fact Book, Leclerc’s (2006) online dataset on language 
policies across the world, the OECD (2006) statistics on Gross Bilateral ODA, the WTO’s 
statistics on bilateral trade from March 2006 and the 2006 Index of Economic Freedom by 
the Heritage Foundation & the Wall Street Journal, as well as consultations of official 
documents in all the sampled countries. 
Table 2 presents the sample means and Table 3 shows the results of the estimated 
ordered logistic model (complete and reduced forms).  
In the complete model, which includes all the above defined variables, the variable 
H (historical settings) appeared non-significant. A test for collinearity revealed it to be 
highly negatively correlated with the community-type settings C (r = -.5815). After testing 
for different specifications of the model, the exclusion of the H variable from the 
regression proved to be the only option to improve the fit of the model as a whole. 
Therefore, the historical settings H are thereafter assumed to be partly embedded in the 
community-type settings C.  
  In the reduced model (which excludes H), all estimates present the expected sign. 
For instance, for a one unit increase in E, the expected ordered log odds increases by 6.07 
as we move to the next higher category of LiE policy. For one unit increase in C, we 
expect a 4.42 increase in the expected log odds as we move to the next higher category of 
LiE policy. Whereas E and C appear strongly significant statistically (at the .05 and 0.1 
levels respectively), there is no statistically significant effect of L, I and D (which is 
actually not surprising given the extremely small size of our sample).  
 Nevertheless, the likelihood ratio chi-square of 19.68 with a p-value of .0014 tells 
us that our model as a whole is statistically significant. Moreover, the tests conducted on 
the proportional odds assumption, namely the likelihood ratio test and the Brant test, both 
confirm that our model does not violate the proportional odds assumption; and the robust 
test applied to test for the presence of heteroskedasticity also confirmed the absence of 
correlation between the error term and the explanatory variables. 
 Hence, what comes out from this analysis is that Lewis’ framework (or at least, our 
arbitrary numerical interpretation of it) appears suitable to explain the contextual factors 
influencing the choice between different types of LiE policy in post-colonial Africa. 
                                                 
17 The 2 trilingual countries are Rwanda and Zimbabwe. 
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According to this model, “unilingual” countries may justify their choice by either a strong 
inclination for a separatist language ideology (C); low initial linguistic commonalities with 
their main external economic or financial partner (E), strong degree of influence from 
external ideologies and practices (D), which corresponds to a high inclination to policy 
borrowing; perfect institutional settings (I) with the same language being taught at school 
and used on the labor market; or a too high number of official languages to choose between 
as media of instruction (L).  
The opposite set of explanations applies to “multilingual” countries, who may 
justify their choice by either a strong inclination to the vernacularization of languages (C); 
high initial linguistic commonalities with their main external economic or financial partner 
(E), low degree of influence from external ideologies and practices (D), which corresponds 
to a low inclination to policy borrowing; weak institutional settings (I) with the need to 
improve the adequacy between the languages being taught at school and the languages 
used on the labor market; or a reasonably low number of official languages to choose 
between as media of instruction (L). 
All the above results can partly be indirectly imputed to the distribution of 
countries within each group, with a majority of English-speaking countries among the 
bilingual countries, and all Lusophone and Arabic-speaking and most Francophone 
countries among unilingual countries. The English-speaking countries are still influenced 
by the British colonial education system, which privileged bilingual mother-tongue 
instruction. At independence, English-speaking countries opted therefore for a 
democratization of the learning of English to the whole population and kept the teaching of 
the mother tongues (which also explains the high weight of the community-type settings 
C). On the contrary, the French and Portuguese colonial policies privileged unilingual 
education systems with instruction exclusively in the colonial language18. The remaining 
unilingualism of these countries is therefore also an indirect heritage of the colonial era but 
with opposite consequences as for former British colonies.  
Finally, all the results presented here should be taken with cautiousness because of 
the exploratory nature of this empirical application, which implies questionable definitions 
of the estimated parameters. The most explicit example is the use of the Index of Economic 
Freedom as a poor proxy of degree of openness to new ideas and practices. Because 
                                                 
18 See Gifford & Louis, 1971; Kelly, 2000; and Lin & Martin, 2005, for an extended overview of colonial 
and postcolonial education in Africa.  
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specification errors in the parameters may increase the risk for collinearity and endogeneity 
which may bias the results, further research should attempt to improve the definition of 
these parameters. 
Hence, by providing some exploratory insights on the role played by environmental 
settings on the number of potential languages of instruction and thereby on the type of LiE 
policy (e.g., unilingualism vs. bilingualism), the model tested in this section answered 
partially the question of which factors may affect the LiE policies in postcolonial Africa 
but it did not tell us whether or not the decision taken was rational. It is, therefore, now 
important to find out which combination of languages, i.e. which LiE policy, would 
theoretically produce an optimal outcome to the community. This second question is 
answered in the next section. 
 
4. What is the optimal decision for a LiE policy-maker? 
 
This section is concerned with how a LiE policy-maker can select the languages of 
instruction that will optimize the utility of its community. A non-cooperative game with 
network externalities is developed as a suggestive option to answer this issue. We rely 
mainly upon the works by Selten & Pool (1991), Church & King (1993) and Dalmazzone 
(1999) who explored the concept of network externalities and how it applies to public 
investments in language knowledge and language learning. More specifically, it relies 
upon Selten & Pool’s (1991) game equilibrium of the distribution of foreign language 
skills, as well as Church & King’s (1993) game-theoretical model of bilingualism and 
network externalities and Dalmazzone’s (1999) discussion of the use and usefulness of 
network externalities to address second language (i.e. any language additional to the 
mother-tongue) issues.  
 
4.1 etwork externalities approach 
 
Dalmazzone (1999) explains that, in the specific context of languages, the network 
externalities approach builds on the assumption that the ‘user-value’ of belonging to a 
given linguistic group increases with the size of the group itself. Hence, learning a 
language means becoming part of a network, that is “a community made up of 
complementary components in which every new entrant, besides gaining access to the 
 
 
41
benefits of a set of services, also adds to the potential benefits of all other members (i.e., 
generates an external effect)” (Dalmazzone, 1999, 63).  
The external effects can be both direct and indirect. The direct external effect is the 
communication value associated with a language, when it is used to serve as an interface in 
the largest possible number of potential interactions. Indeed, in order to benefit from the 
knowledge in a language, one needs to interact with at least one other person who knows 
that language. In a community of n individuals speaking the same language, there are n(n-
1) potential binary interactions. Further, an additional (n+1)th individual speaking the 
same language would yield direct benefits to all others by adding 2n potential new 
interactions. This means that once a language has acquired an advantage over other 
potential alternatives, its comparative advantage tends to become greater and greater (e.g., 
this is the case of English, which is now the most commonly studied foreign language and 
the most used language of commerce, communication and information storage19).  
In addition to this direct effect, an additional member of a linguistic group can also 
provide an indirect benefit to other members by increasing the demand for language-
sensitive goods and services (schools, libraries, bookstores, broadcasting, theatre, 
productions, etc.) and thereby, if economies of scale are present, improving the supply and 
possibly the variety of such services within the community. Although it is generally 
assumed that externalities associated to a network are positive, they can become negative 
when the exposure of a small country to a larger linguistic community’s culture and 
ideologies leads to the loss of its indigenous culture and set of beliefs. In this particular 
case, not belonging to the linguistic network would be more beneficial since it would 
provide that country with a natural protection against cultural colonization and other 
unwanted foreign mass cultural products.  
An important point highlighted by Dalmazzone (1999) is the fact that the number 
of speakers alone is not necessarily the only, nor always the most, fundamental factor in 
determining the communication value of a language. Rather, it is important to take into 
account factors such as the variety of the potential interactions, the particular purpose or 
job for which the language is to be used, the geographic and economic position of a 
country, etc.  
                                                 
19 English counts 397 million secondary speakers, and 70 percent of the world’s mail and about 80 percent of 
all information stored in data banks are estimated to be in English (Dalmazzone, 1999).  
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Selten & Pool’s (1991) predictive model of some general features of distributions 
of non-native20 language skills demonstrates the role played by the size of a language 
community in determining the strategic choice to learn a foreign language. Their model 
defines the learning costs, communicative benefit and payoffs at individual, group and 
aggregated levels. Finally, they provide a proof of the existence of equilibrium points for 
every aggregated game. This very theoretical work is a solid input in the research on 
language acquisition as a network externality game. 
Finally, building on Selten & Pool (1991), Church & King (1993) derived a formal 
proof that the private optimum of foreign language learning and the collective optimum 
may not coincide21 by applying conclusions reached by the literature on network 
externalities to problems of language. Their result implies that the maximization of 
collective welfare, in the presence of externalities in a language market, requires collective 
institutions capable of internalizing the externality (i.e. capable of correcting the 
inefficiencies in the aggregated result of individual choices) (Dalmazzone, 1999). In other 
terms, languages are public goods and require LiE policies to maximize their utility.  
In his analysis of knowledge as a global public good, Stiglitz (2006) insists on two 
critical properties of public goods: non-rivalrous consumption and non-exclusivity. Non-
rivalrous consumption occurs when the consumption of one individual does not detract 
from that of another (i.e. the marginal cost of usage is zero), and non-exclusivity means 
that it is difficult, if not impossible, to exclude an individual from enjoying the good. It is 
easy to see how the knowledge of languages satisfies both attributes: if I teach you a 
language, I continue to enjoy (even more) the knowledge of the language at the same time 
as you; and, by the same token, once the language is accessible for learning in all schools, 
anyone can enjoy the language, i.e. no one can be excluded, so everyone might want to 
enjoy it. Hence, the central public policy implication of public goods is that the state must 
play some role in the provision of such goods to make sure they will not become 
undersupplied. One way of financing this type of investment is by charging a monopoly 
price on the language. Carr (1985) was the first to defend this idea that the market of 
languages is similar to a natural monopoly.  
                                                 
20 The terminology “native” versus “non-native” languages is used by Selten & Pool (1991) to designate 
“mother-tongues” versus “foreign languages”.  
21 Whereas the private optimum results from the uncoordinated investments of individuals maximizing their 
own utility, the collective optimum maximizes total social welfare (see Church & King, 1993, for further 
details). 
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Dalmazzone (1999) builds upon this monopoly assumption and highlights that the 
presence of positive effects related to network size can give rise to a “critical mass”, which 
corresponds to a minimum size for a linguistic group, relative to the whole population, 
necessary to be sustained in equilibrium. Hence, minority languages of small populations 
can easily be assimilated if they are not effectively protected, because the return on a 
human capital investment in these languages is perceived as low, ceteris paribus (“all other 
things being equal”), relative to the yield on other languages. Conversely, once diffusion 
has reached a given level, further expansion may be self-sustaining.  
This theoretical hypothesis seems to fit rather well the context of selection and use 
of African languages, which appear to have been successful only when the given languages 
were spoken by large numbers of people. Swahili has been successfully used in Tanzania 
and Kenya. Similarly, Hausa, which is spoken by more than 8 million people in Nigeria, is 
serving both the purposes of literacy and national integration at least in the northern parts 
of Nigeria and in neighboring Niger (Ntiri, 1993, 363). Moreover, the decision to adopt an 
African language for an educational purpose is often not based on the mother tongue 
criterion (how large a number of people speak the language as a mother tongue) but on the 
community language criterion (the function of the language as the dominant means of 
communication in a certain area of the country), which refers to the network externalities 
approach. In this context, there are about 159 languages identified as community languages 
that serve the purposes of general communication over fairly wide areas within countries in 
Africa (UNESCO/BREDA, 1985, 10). Twenty-three of these are shared community 
languages, that is, they are spoken in more than two countries. For example, Fulfulde is 
spoken in 10 countries and Kiswahili and Malinke in six. Monolingualism in an African 
language is reported for only seven countries, namely: Cape Verde, Comores, Lesotho, the 
Seychelles, Somalia, Swaziland and Madagascar. All others adopt more than one African 
language for educational purposes (ibid, 13).  
Dalmazzone (1999) summarizes the prerequisites for efficient public intervention 
in the provision of public goods that embed complex systems, such as culture, traditions 
and languages, by referring to Arthur’s (1988) four generic conditions: (1) large set-up or 
fixed costs; (2) learning effects; (3) coordination effects; and (4) adaptive expectations.  
Whereas large set-up and fixed costs such as those associated with the investment 
necessary to the maintenance and development of a modern language give the advantage of 
falling unit costs as the size of the speech community expands, learning effects improve 
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the efficiency of investments in language capital, provision of language-related services 
and, more generally, activities meant to promote a language diffusion and export. 
Moreover, coordination effects refer to the advantages associated with undertaking actions 
and making choices synergetic to those of the other individuals in the same environment. 
These effects result from the application of cooperative games, i.e. “the formation of 
coalitions in which participants must work together to maximize a payoff, which will later 
be divided among members” (Cornes & Sandler, 1996, 18)22. Finally, adaptive 
expectations account for the fact that the increased prevalence of a language enhances 
beliefs of further prevalence. 
From Selten & Pool’s (1991) and Church & King’s (1993)23 game-theoretic models 
of bilingual education policies we know that if the available policy instruments affect all 
members of a language group homogeneously, then policies that effectively subsidize 
language acquisition are warranted only for the majority language (i.e. the language with 
the largest number of speakers). The analysis run in the previous section verifies this 
assumption (see effect of C = 1 on logLiE). Hence, we expect that the belonging to a large 
linguistic network will be more prized than the willingness to give equal status to all 
languages independently of the size of the linguistic population.  
This supports as well what Dalmazzone (1999) explains with regard to the potential 
negative nature of network externalities, that is that the belonging to networks has a 
negative impact on the survival of endogenous languages in the formulation of national 
LiE policies. Again, this is confirmed by the analysis run in previous section where the 
languages of instructions are often the same as the languages of the former colonial power, 
or trade partner or donor partner. African countries tend to opt for bilingual education 
systems mainly to support/facilitate the learning of a colonial language or international 
trade language24. For instance, among the few bilingual Francophone countries, only one is 
bilingual in a national language, namely Burundi. All the others are bilingual in French and 
English or French and Arabic, which are all international languages.  
                                                 
22 Although pure public goods are often associated with non-cooperative games, it is expected that the 
repetition of plays of the games might elicit the cooperative strategy as players see that cooperation will 
augment everyone’s payoffs when compared with non-cooperation (see Prisoners’ Dilemma) (Cornes & 
Sandler, 1996).  
23 We strongly recommend the reading of Selten & Pool’s (1991) and Church & King’s (1993) respective 
article for an appreciation of the game-theoretic models they have developed and upon which this study 
relies.  
24 As shown in Table 2A, whenever used, mother-tongue instruction is merely used in pre-primary education 
and first cycle of primary education before transiting to a colonial or international language. 
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Hence, the high weight put on colonial and trade networks confirms Selten & 
Pool’s (1991), Church & King’s (1993) and Dalmazzone’s (1999) common hypothesis that 
the incentive to learn a language increases with the size of the network.  
 
4.2 The model 
 
Based on the theoretical principles of the public goods’ network externalities 
approach presented above, this paper proposes to develop a non-cooperative game model 
describing how an African policy-maker can choose optimally the languages of instruction 
in schools depending on the strategy adopted by the other policy-makers, e.g., former 
colonial powers, trade partners, main foreign investors and bilateral donors. 
From Selten & Pool’s (1991) model, we keep three important assumptions: (1) we 
impose no limit on the number of languages in existence; (2) we assume that there is a 
positive number of languages in the world; and (3) we treat as fixed the distribution of 
native languages, assuming that everyone has one and only one native language25. These 
restrictions allow Selten & Pool to partition the world population into communities, each 
community consisting of the native speakers of a particular language.  
However, whereas Selten & Pool and Church & King assume that a member of 
language community i always learns language i and has no choice in this respect (which 
delimitates their analysis to second language acquisition), our model assumes that the 
learning of language i is conditioned by the individual strategy (hence, it is not obvious). 
This assumption is necessary to reflect the reality in African countries where individuals 
are not necessarily taught in their native language (see results from previous section in that 
matter). Therefore, our model aims at broadening the scope of Selten & Pool’s and Church 
& King’s studies.  
The game takes place in a world with m languages, 1, …, m. Every individual has 
one and only one of these languages as his native language. He is a native speaker of that 
language. Every language other than an individual’s native language is a foreign language 
for that individual. Let M be the set {1, …, m} of all languages. All languages are perfect 
substitutes. This assumption was applied by Church & King (1993) to overcome the 
                                                 
25 In addition to the three assumptions presented here, Selten & Pool (1991) also identify a fourth 
assumption, namely they permit languages with native speakers and languages without native speakers to 
exist. Although this assumption may be justified by attempts to create non-native languages such as 
“Esperanto” to play the role of international lingua franca, no such language actively belongs today to the 
languages of the world (see Grimes, 2000). This assumption has therefore no rationality in our model. 
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difficulties raised by the fact that some languages may be more efficient communicative 
media than others and that some languages might beneficiate from particular intrinsic 
value. Here, “no one cares if one language disappears, and no one prefers communicating 
in one language rather than in an other” (ibid, 343)26. 
The set of all individuals with native language i is the community i. Each language 
community i is described as a continuum of individuals represented as points in an interval 
[i, i + ia ], with ia  > 0. Each member of the ith community is identified with a number s 
such that ii s i a≤ ≤ + . The measure of all individuals is normalized to 1: 
 
 (2.1)   
1
1
m
i
i
a
=
=∑ . 
 
We call ia  the size of language community i. The players of the game are the 
members of the language communities 1, …, m. Geometrically, the world community can 
therefore be represented as a set of m line segments, where m is the number of 
communities. The ith community is represented as a line segment from i to i + ia . Figure 3 
replicates the example given by Selten & Pool (1991) of such a geometric representation 
for a world of four communities. The sum of the lengths of the four line segments is 1. 
Each individual must know at least one language to be able to communicate with 
others. We assume that all members of the language communities are identical except for 
their language endowment27. Each player can choose between three pure strategies. He/she 
can learn his/her native language (i.e. mother-tongue) at a learning cost ic  and remain 
unilingual. He/she can learn a non-native language (i.e. foreign language) at a cost jc  
(where j is any other language than i) or decide to learn both his/her native language and a 
non-native language (and thereby become bilingual) at a cost i jc + , where i jc c<  and 
i j i jc c c+ = + . The benefit of language i is a function of the size of the community i, ia  and 
the cost of learning a language is a function of the degree to which the language learnt is 
                                                 
26 For analyses not treating languages as perfect substitutes, see Marschak (1965), Sabourin (1985) and Grin 
(1992). 
27 Church & King (1993) use this assumption. 
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different from the native language28. Hence, the cost of learning the native language (or 
mother tongue) will be assumed to tend towards null and the cost of learning a foreign 
language to tend towards 1.   
A member is   obtains utility ( )iv a  if he learns only his native language i, ( )jv a  if 
he learns only a foreign language j and ( )i jv a a+  if he learns both his native language and 
a foreign language j. It is the fact that we assume that the utility of each member increases 
with the size of the community, i.e. v’ > 0, that creates the existence of the network 
externality underlying this model. Hence, the payoff of is  associated with learning a 
language is affected by the learning decisions of all other individuals, including the 
member of his own community i.  
To solve the equilibrium of this game let us fix the number of world languages to 
two, i.e. 2m = . Hence, a member 1s  obtains utility 1( )v a  if he learns only language 1 (i.e. 
his mother tongue), 2( )v a  if he learns only language 2 and 1 2( )v a a+  if he learns both 
languages.  
 
4.3 Equilibrium 
 
By assuming that no agent learns unless there is a strictly positive net benefit from 
doing so, we can formulate the best-response functions as the following decision rules: 
 
(2.2a)  any member 1s  learns language 1 iff 1 2 2 1ˆ( ) ( )v a v a a c− + > ;  
(2.2b)   any member 1s  learns language 2 iff 2 1 1 2ˆ( ) ( )v a v a a c− + > ; 
(2.2c)  any member 1s  learns languages 1 and 2  
iff 1 2 1 1 1 2ˆ( ) ( )v a a v a a c c+ − + > + ; 
 
and reciprocally,  
 
(2.2a)’  any member 2s  learns language 1 iff 2 1 1 2ˆ( ) ( )v a v a a c− + > ; 
                                                 
28 Selten & Pool (1991) opt for a similar assumption, focusing however, on the differences of learning costs 
between foreign languages, whereas Church & King (1993) opt for identical costs of learning for all 
languages. Here, we opt for a differentiation of learning costs between native and foreign languages, 
assuming the learning cost of all foreign languages to be identical.  
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(2.2b)’  any member 2s  learns language 2 iff 1 2 2 1ˆ( ) ( )v a v a a c− + > ; 
(2.2c)’  any member 2s  learns languages 1 and 2  
iff 1 2 2 2 1 2ˆ( ) ( )v a a v a a c c+ − + > + ; 
 
where 1aˆ  and 2aˆ  are the number of individuals from the other community that choose to 
speak language 2 and the number of individuals from the other community that choose to 
speak language 1, respectively, in equilibrium.  
We now assume that the language community 1 is larger than the language 
community 2 ( 1 2a a>  ⇔  1 2( ) ( )v a v a> ) and the cost of learning a mother tongue is much 
less than the cost of learning a foreign language ( i jc c< ). For simplification we assume 
that the learning cost of learning a mother-tongue is equal to zero and the learning cost of 
learning a foreign language is equal to 1 ( 0, 1i jc c= = )  The Nash equilibrium of this game 
is characterized by proposition 1. 
 
PROPOSITION 1: 
(i) If 1 2 1 1 2 2( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) jv a a v a v a a v a c+ − < + − < , then ( 1 2ˆ ˆ0, 0a a= = ) is the unique 
pure-strategy Nash equilibrium; 
(ii) If 1 2 1 1 2 2( ) ( ) ( ) ( )jv a a v a c v a a v a+ − < < + − , then there are two pure-strategy 
Nash equilibria ( 1 1 2ˆ ˆ, 0a a a= = ) and ( 1 1 2 2ˆ ˆ, 0a a a a= + = ); 
(iii) If 1 2 1( ) ( )jc v a a v a< + − , then there exist three pure-strategy Nash equilibria 
( 1 1 2 2ˆ ˆ, 0a a a a= + = ) , ( 1 2 1 2ˆ ˆ0,a a a a= = + ) and  ( 1 1 2 2 1 2ˆ ˆ,a a a a a a= + = + ); 
Proof:  
(The proof of Proposition 1 follows the same logic as the first proposition of the model by 
Church & King, 1993)29         
 
 
According to proposition 1, if the cost of learning a foreign language is too high, 
then no one learns a foreign language, which means that unilingualism in mother-tongue is 
optimal. If the cost of bilingualism pays for speakers of language 2 but not for speakers of 
language 1 (because 1 2a a> ), then there are two pure-strategy Nash equilibrium. The first 
                                                 
29 See Church & King’s (1993) appendix p. 344. 
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is that all speakers of language 2 learn language 1 (unilingualism in a foreign language) 
and speakers of language 1 only learn language 1. The second is that all speakers of 
language 2 learn both language 1 and 2 (bilingualism) and speakers of language 1 only 
learn language 1. If the cost is very low, then there are three equilibria. In the first 
equilibrium, all speakers of language 2 learn languages 1 and 2 and speakers of language 1 
only learn language 1. In the second equilibrium, all speakers of language 1 learn 
languages 1 and 2 and all speakers of language 2 learn language 2. In the third equilibrium, 
all speakers of languages 1 and 2 learn both languages 1 and 2.  
Further, let us assume that the decision of any agent of a language community to 
learn only his mother tongue, only a foreign language or become bilingual is representative 
of the decision of all the members of that community30. Hence, the efficiency of the 
strategy adopted by a policy maker who wishes to maximize total surplus depends again on 
the learning costs ic  , jc  and i jc + .  
Let the total surplus be denoted by W  if both communities decide to only learn 
their respective native language (mother-tongue education policy); BBW  if both 
communities decide to become bilingual in languages 1 and 2 (bilingual education policy); 
BW  if community 1 decides to learn both languages 1 and 2 and community 2 only learns 
its native language; BW  if community 1 only learns its native language and community 2 
decides to become bilingual; 12W  if community 1 decides to learn only language 2 and 
community 2 learns its national language (language 2); 21W  if community 2 decides to 
learn only language 1 (unilingual education policy in foreign language) and community 1 
only learns language 1 (mother-tongue education policy); 12BW  if community 1 learns only 
language 2 and community 2 decides to become bilingual; and 21BW  if community 1 
decides to become bilingual and community 2 learns only language 1. In this context, 
1 2a a> , 0ic =  and 1jc =  yield: 
 
(2.3a)   1 1 2 2( ) ( )W a v a a v a= + ; 
(2.3b)   12 21 1 2 1 2 1 2 2 12( ) ( ) ( )BB B BW W W a a v a a a c a c= = = + + − + ; 
(2.3c)   12 2 2 1 2 1 2 1 2( ) ( ) ( )B W W a v a a a v a a a c= = + + + − ; 
                                                 
30 This assumption is applied by Selten & Pool (1991) and Church & King (1993). 
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(2.3d)   21 1 1 1 2 1 2 2 1( ) ( ) ( )B W W a v a a a v a a a c= = + + + − . 
 
PROPOSITION 2: 
(i) BB B BW W W< <  
(ii)  BW W<  iff [ ] [ ]1 1 2 1 2 1 2 2( ) ( ) ( ) ( )c a a v a a v a a v a< + + + −  
 
 
Proof: 
(i) Follows directly from (2.3b), (2.3c) and (2.3d), since 1 2a a> . 
(ii) From (2.3a) and (2.3d), 1 2 1 2 2 1 2 2( ) ( ) ( )B W W a a v a a a c a v a− = + + − −  which is 
positive iff proposition (ii) holds.       
 
 
According to proposition 2, when taking into consideration the benefits of 
communication and the cost of learning a foreign language (assuming the cost of learning a 
mother-tongue equal to zero), the optimal policy is the one where the community 1 learns 
its native language (language 1) and the community two decides to learn both languages, 
or to learn only the language of community 1 (i.e. the language of the majority). This result 
confirms the ones from Church & King (1993) and Selten & Pool (1991). The reason why 
it is never optimal for all individuals to become bilingual is because the sufficient 
condition for all individuals to be able to communicate with each other is that one 
community becomes bilingual. If more than one community learns both languages, no 
further gains will be generated (Church & King, 1993, 340).  
Moreover, the reason why group 2 should become bilingual and not group 1 is 
because we assume the size of the language community 1 to be larger than the one of 
community 2. Hence, only the smallest group should become bilingual or at least learn the 
language of the majority group (size effect).  
Finally, when comparing the private optima (proposition 1) with the social optima 
(proposition 2), it appears that when the cost of learning is very high it is privately and 
socially optimal to learn only the native language; when the cost is very low, it is privately 
and socially optimal for members of communities 1 and 2 to learn language 1.  
Nevertheless, the private and social equilibria do not coincide anymore when the cost of 
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learning is close to its maximum border (i.e. [ ] [ ]1 2 1 2 1 2 2( ) ( ) ( ) ( )a a v a a v a a v a+ + + − . In 
that case, it is socially optimal for everyone to learn language 1 but it is privately optimal 
for everyone to only learn the native language. In equilibrium, both groups will therefore 
learn their native language only. Again this result confirms the findings by Church & King 
(1993), who explain this divergence between the efficient and Nash equilibrium solutions 
as a consequence of the existence of network externalities: “when an individual makes the 
choice whether to learn or not, she does not take into account the benefit that others get 
from being able to communicate with one additional person” (ibid, 341).   
 Finally, it is worth noticing that in all cases, it is always more efficient to learn at 
least the native language (as component of a bilingual education program or as unique 
language of instruction when the cost of learning a foreign language is too high). However, 
our model has also shown that the presence of network externalities in cooperative games 
can cause the extinction of minority languages. As suggested by Dalmazzone (1999), apart 
from the application of targeted bilingualism to specific linguistic groups, another way to 
combat this extinction is therefore by applying cooperative games. By forming coalitions, 
members of minority linguistic groups may work together to maximize a payoff, which 
could later be divided among members. Both the private and social equilibria could be 
affected by such cooperation in favor of minority languages. By producing learning effects 
(through the development of services and media or other diffusion networks in the 
minority language) the coalitions could even generate sufficient payoff to incite the 
majority language group to learn the minority language (i.e. B BW W> , where 
12B W W=  and 21B W W=  still hold).  
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Figure 1 
Conceptual framework 
Note: See Figure 2 for further details 
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Figure 2  
Path towards the adoption of a LiE policy 
 
Note: The environmental settings (E.S.) are composed of diffusion variables (e.g., inter-country 
communication), setting variables (e.g., historical settings, institutional settings, behavioral settings, external 
settings, and community-type settings), and mobility variables (e.g., nomadism vs. seasonal migration, and 
voluntary vs. involuntary migration). The nine types of language policies are derived from Leclerc (2006) 
and the LiE policies from Trueba (1979) and Skutnabb-Kangas & Garcia (1995). 
 58
 
 
 
____    ____    _______    ___  
1      1+ 1a   2      2+ 2a   3             3+ 3a    4     4+ 4a  
 
Figure 3 
Partition of hypothetical population into native-language communities  
(Source: Selten & Pool, 1991, 66) 
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Table 1  
Variable values 
  LiEp
a
 L B E C I H D
b
 
Angola 0 1 0 0.33 0 1 1 0.433 
Benin 0 1 0 0.33 0 1 1 0.543 
Botswana 0 2 0 1 1 1 0.5 0.703 
Burkina Faso 0 4 0 0.67 0 1 1 0.557 
Burundi 2 2 1 0.33 1 0.67 0.5 0.496 
Cameroon 1 2 0 0.67 1 1 1 0.542 
Central Africa 2 1 0 1 0 0.5 1 0.548 
Congo-
Brazzaville 
0 1 0 0.67 0 1 1 0.264
c
 
Congo-Kinshasa 0 1 0 0.33 0 0 1 0.436 
Cote d’Ivoire 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0.568 
Egypt 0 1 0 0 0 0.5 0 0.522 
Gabon 0 1 0 0.67 0 1 1 0.549 
Gambia 0 1 0 0.33 0 1 1 0.579 
Ghana 0 1 0 0.33 0 0 1 0.567 
Guinea-Bissau 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0.471 
Kenya 2 1 0 1 0 0.5 1 0.60 
Lesotho 2 2 1 1 1 1 0.5 0.57 
Libya 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0.343 
Mali 0 32 1 0.67 0 0.5 1 0.541 
Mauritania 1 2 0 0.33 1 0.5 0.5 0.556 
Morocco 0 2 0 0 0 0.33 0.5 0.53 
Mozambique 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0.551 
Namibia 2 13 1 0.67 1 0.33 0.5 0.609 
Niger 0 21 1 1 1 1 0.33 0.536 
Nigeria 0 4 0 0.67 1 1 0.5 0.488 
Rwanda 3 3 1 0.67 1 1 0.33 0.543 
Senegal 0 7 1 0.67 1 1 0.33 0.574 
Sierra Leona 0 1 0 0.33 0 0.25 1 0.467 
South Africa 2 11 1 0.67 1 1 0.67 0.663 
Swaziland 2 2 0 0.67 1 1 0.5 0.622 
Tanzania 2 2 0 0.67 1 1 0.5 0.593 
Togo 0 3 0 0.67 0 1 1 0.485 
Tunisia 0 2 0 0 1 0.33 0.5 0.592 
Zambia 0 8 0 1 1 1 0.5 0.591 
Zimbabwe 3 9 1 1 1 1 0.33 0.34 
Notes: (a) LiEp: 0. Unilingual; 1. Bilingual (excl. Mother-tongue); 2. Bilingual (incl. Mother-tongue); 3. 
Trilingual. (b). All values of D (Index of Economic Freedom) are computed for the year 2006 except for 
Congo-Brazille (c), for which the latest valid data is from year 2000.  
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Table 2  
Summary statistics 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
LiEp 35 .6857143     1.022437          0 3 
L 35 4.228571     6.472047          1 32 
E 35 .5528572     .3433877          0 1 
C 35 .4571429     .5054327          0 1 
I 35 .7545714     .3497843          0 1 
H 35 .6997143     .3207756          0 1 
D 35 .5306286     .0879826       .264        .703 
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Table 3  
Results Ordered logistic regression  
a. Complete model   
Ordered logistic regression                       Number of obs   =         35 
                                                  LR chi2(6)      =      19.68 
                                                  Prob > chi2     =     0.0032 
Log likelihood = -23.071533                       Pseudo R2       =     0.2990 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
        liep |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
           l |  -.1735128   .1150151    -1.51   0.131    -.3989383    .0519127 
           e |   6.068395*  2.514478     2.41   0.016     1.140108    10.99668 
           c |   4.419177** 1.90489      2.32   0.020     .6856611    8.152693 
           i |  -3.910656   2.251928    -1.74   0.082    -8.324354    .5030427 
           h |   -.008578   2.381896    -0.00   0.997    -4.677007    4.659851 
           d |  -6.350042   5.947425    -1.07   0.286    -18.00678    5.306697 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       /cut1 |   .0610169   3.377253                     -6.558277    6.680311 
       /cut2 |   .4983525   3.390367                     -6.146645     7.14335 
       /cut3 |   3.072046   3.317035                     -3.429223    9.573314 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
legend: * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001 
                 
b. Multicollinearity test 
(obs=35) 
 
             |        l        e        c        i        h        d 
-------------+------------------------------------------------------ 
           l |   1.0000 
           e |   0.3100   1.0000 
           c |   0.2189   0.3685   1.0000 
           i |   0.0263   0.4368   0.2923   1.0000 
           h |  -0.1202   0.0485  -0.5815   0.0893   1.0000 
           d |   0.1118   0.2374   0.3492   0.1480  -0.0179   1.0000 
 
c. Reduced model 
Ordered logistic regression                       Number of obs   =         35 
                                                  LR chi2(5)      =      19.68 
                                                  Prob > chi2     =     0.0014 
Log likelihood = -23.071539                       Pseudo R2       =     0.2990 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
        liep |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
           l |  -.1733908   .1098959    -1.58   0.115    -.3887829    .0420012 
           e |   6.067499*  2.501969     2.43   0.015      1.16373    10.97127 
           c |   4.422515** 1.664344     2.66   0.008     1.160461    7.684569 
           i |  -3.911179   2.247007    -1.74   0.082    -8.315232    .4928752 
           d |  -6.353552   5.866549    -1.08   0.279    -17.85178    5.144673 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       /cut1 |   .0666254    2.99782                     -5.808993    5.942244 
       /cut2 |   .5039706    3.01121                     -5.397893    6.405835 
       /cut3 |   3.077235   2.988813                     -2.780731    8.935201 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
legend: * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001 
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The Role of Language in Learning Achievement:  
A amibian Case study
∗
 
 
Christelle Garrouste+ 
 
Abstract 
This study investigates the role played by home language and language proficiency on learning 
achievement. It compares characteristics of 5048 Grade-6 learners in 275 Namibian schools. The outcome 
variable is the standardized SACMEQ mathematics achievement score collected in year 2000. Hierarchical 
linear modeling is used to partition the total variance in mathematics achievement into its within- and 
between-school components. The social distribution of achievement in each school is represented by a 
within-school model regressing mathematics achievement on home language, gender, social class (SES), 
grade repetition and reading test scores. The between-school model serves in turn at explaining 
heterogeneities as a function of school characteristics. An explanatory model is developed to identify specific 
features of school’s academic organization and normative environment that are expected to contribute to the 
distribution of achievement. The results of the analysis show that although home language plays a limited 
role in explaining within-school variations in mathematics achievement and no significant role at the 
between-school level, language proficiency appears to play a much stronger role in explaining both within- 
and between-school heterogeneity of scores in Namibia, which confirms the role of language skills in 
learning achievement. 
 
Keywords: Learning achievement, language skills, multilevel analysis, HLM, Namibia. 
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Introduction 
 
The need for reconstruction after the Second World War has rapidly led to a world-
wide growth of interest in the application of large-scale scientific survey research 
techniques to the study of issues related to improving the productivity of workers through 
an increase of the number of literate people, among which Husén’s (1969) work and the 
international research ran by the Association for the Evaluation of Education and 
Achievement (IEA) in the early 1970s which encompassed twenty-three countries (see 
Elley, 1992, 1994; Lundberg & Linnakyla, 1993; Postlethwaite & Ross, 1992). This trend 
spread progressively to developing countries. In the 1980s the focus of these surveys 
slowly moved from an increase of quantity of education to an improvement of quality of 
education. Most occidental countries and an increasing number of developing countries are 
now applying such techniques to undertake systematic studies of the conditions of 
schooling and student achievement levels.  
Summarizing the results of the IEA and other studies for developing countries, 
Alexander & Simmons (1975) note the lack of consistency across studies and the 
conflicting nature of the results. For instance, school-related variables, such as class size, 
school size, and teacher characteristics, appear to be significant in some countries and non-
significant (or negatively significant) in others. Finally, although non-school variables 
appear of high importance in all the studies, home background seems to have less influence 
on pupils’ performance in developing than in developed countries. 
 In 1983, Heyman & Loxley examined the effects of socioeconomic status and 
school factors on students’ science achievement in primary school in sixteen low-income 
countries and thirteen high-income countries. They observed that the influence of family 
background varies significantly with national economic development between countries, 
and that the percentage of achievement variance explained by school and teacher variables 
is negatively correlated with the level of a country’s development. This result is confirmed 
by Saha (1983) and Fuller (1987) who examined the effects of school factors on student 
achievement in the Third World. Fuller concluded that “much of this empirical work 
suggests that the school institution exerts a greater influence on achievement within 
developing countries compared to industrialized nations, after accounting for the effect of 
pupil background” (pp. 255-6; italics in original).  
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Further studies have highlighted the role of language proficiency on academic 
achievement. For instance, Geary, Bew-Thomas, Liu & Stigler (1996) found that the 
language structure of Asian number names assisted Chinese children in developing 
meaningful early number concepts. Valverde (1984) noted that differences in English and 
Spanish contributed to Hispanic Americans’ poor performance and involvement in 
mathematics (see also Bush, 2002, for similar conclusions).  
 More recent international survey data have attempted to improve the quality of 
sampling methods to enable the run of more valid and sophisticated forms of statistical 
analyses. One example of such effort is the cooperative project launched in 1991 by the 
International Institute for Educational Planning (IIEP) together with a number of Ministries 
of Education in the Southern Africa Sub-region for the establishment of long-term 
strategies for building the capacity of educational planners to monitor and evaluate basic 
education systems. In 1993, an association was created to extend the reach and formal 
status of that work, namely the Southern Africa Consortium for Monitoring Educational 
Quality (SACMEQ), and in 1995 the first SACMEQ survey project was launched in six 
Southern African countries. The SACMEQ I project was completed in 1998 followed by 
the SACMEQ II project launched in 2000 in fourteen Southern and Eastern African 
countries. 
By 2005, all fourteen national reports presenting the results from SACMEQ II had 
been released. What emerged from these results was the fact that most countries were still 
demonstrating large between- and within-school variations. Within-school variation is an 
indication of differences in abilities among learners within each school, and between-
school variations, an indication of equity problems within the education system. South 
Africa, followed by Uganda and Namibia, demonstrated then the highest percentage of 
between-school variation.  
More specifically, the Namibian results display very poor learners and teachers 
reading and mathematics scores, a definite decline in reading scores between the first 
SACMEQ study of 1995 and the second one of 2000 and considerable variation among 
regions (Makuwa, 2005). These results deserve further investigation in view of the high 
resource allocation efforts made by the Namibian authorities to launch substantial 
education reforms since independence in 1990, including the adoption of a bilingual 
language-in-education policy aiming primarily at facilitating the cognitive development 
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and, hence, the learning process of pupils, and with regard to the ambitious National Plans 
formulated since 1999.  
Hence, after a short review of the status of Namibian schools and political agenda 
at the time the SACMEQ II was conducted (i.e. year 2000), this paper attempts to 
investigate the main factors explaining the poor scores of Namibian Grade-6 learners. 
More specifically, the objective is to see whether the home language and language 
proficiency constitute a significant discrimination factor in mathematics achievement to 
explain the within-school and between-school variations. The method used is an adaptation 
of the Hierarchical Linear Modeling (HLM). This paper follows the theoretical steps 
enounced by Bryk & Raudenbush (1988) and Hox (1995) for the use of the HLM method 
for education analyses. 
 
amibia’s School Structure and Policy Agenda at the Time of the Study 
 
The Republic of Namibia is situated on the south west coast of Africa and is 
bordered by the Atlantic Ocean to the west, the republics of Angola and Zambia to the 
north and north-east respectively and the republics of Botswana and South Africa to the 
east and south respectively. It obtained national independence from former apartheid South 
African government on March 21, 1990, after many years of political, diplomatic and 
armed, national liberation struggle. Even if the country is well endowed with good deposits 
of uranium, diamonds, and other minerals as well as rich fishing grounds, there are wide 
disparities in the distribution of incomes. With a per capita income of US$2,000 Namibia 
may be regarded as a middle income country. Yet, the richest 10 percent of the society still 
receives 65 percent of the incomes. As a consequence, the ratio of per capita income 
between the top 5 percent and the bottom 50 percent is about 50:1 (Makuwa, 2005). This 
provides a brief understanding of the socio-economic context under which the education 
system has to develop in Namibia.  
Since independence, Namibia has made strides in the provision of basic education, 
which by 2001 had resulted in a primary education net enrolment of 94 percent of all 
children aged 7-13 (in Grades 1-7), and by 2006 Namibia ranked among the top eight 
African countries in term of primary completion rate ( > 80 percent) (Vespoor, 2006). 
While much seems to have been achieved in terms of access to schooling, the quality of 
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education, efficiency and equity issues are since the late 1990s at the center of political 
preoccupations.  
Because Article 20 of the Constitution of the Republic of Namibia provides for free 
and compulsory education for all learners between the ages of 6 and 16 or learners from 
Grade 1 up to the end of Grade 7; and because the government has declared education to 
be a priority among all other priorities in Namibia, education has received since 
independence the largest share of the national recurrent budget. For instance, out of the 
estimated total government current expenditure of N$8.35 billion for the 2001/2002 
financial year, N$1.86 billion, i.e. about 20 percent of the budget, was earn-marked for 
basic education only. Of the total amount allocated for basic education, N$986.56 million 
was earn-marked for primary education and the rest for secondary education. Yet, almost 
90 percent of the money allocated for primary education was spent on personnel costs 
(e.g., salaries and/or subsidies to teachers in a number of private schools), leaving only 
about 10 percent for all the other services and school supplies (Makuwa, 2005). As a 
consequence, the financial allocation per learner ratio is more favorable to regions with 
more qualified staff and fewer learners than to rural regions with more unqualified teachers 
and large pupil-teacher ratios. Finally, the authorized practice of collect by schools of 
school development funds from parents is again more favorable to schools in urban areas 
where parents have an income than to schools in more remote areas. 
 In addition to these obvious resource allocation issues, it is also important to 
highlight the many changes that took place in the education sector between 1995 and 2000. 
As explained in Makuwa’s (2005) report, there were for instance more learners and more 
schools in 2000 than in 1995; the department of Sport was added to the Ministry of Basic 
Education and Culture; and, more important, the HIV/AIDS pandemic became a national 
problem affecting infected administrators, teachers, learners and/or parents. In view of 
these new contextual settings, the Ministry of Basic Education, sports and Culture 
(MBESC) defined eight new national priority areas in its “Strategic Plan” for the period 
2001-2006: equitable access; education quality; teacher education and support; physical 
facilities; efficiency and effectiveness; HIV/AIDS; lifelong learning; and sports, arts and 
cultural heritage.  
Finally, to understand the context framing the data used in this study, it is also 
essential to give an overview of the structure of the Namibian primary school system. The 
primary phase consists of the Lower Primary (Grades 1-4), during which mother tongue is 
 70
used as medium of instruction, and Upper Primary (Grades 5-7), during which English 
becomes the medium of instruction up to Grade 12. By the year 2000, there were 998 
primary schools hosting a total of 406,623 learners, of which 952 were government schools 
and the rest were private schools. Nearly two thirds of all primary schools were located in 
the six most populated northern regions namely, Caprivi, Kavango, Ohangwena, Oshikoto, 
Oshana and Omusati.  
It is in the above milieu that the second SACMEQ survey used in the present paper 
was conducted and it is therefore in that frame that the results of the analysis should be 
interpreted. 
 
Data and method 
 
The sampling procedure for the SACMEQ II survey was geared by methodological 
recommendations to all participating countries, but with certain flexibility to take into 
account contextual differences. Hence, as for all other participating countries, the desired 
target population in Namibia was all learners enrolled in Grade 6 in the ninth month of the 
school year (i.e. in September 2000). The net enrolment ratio for the age group 7-13 years 
old who were enrolled in Grades 1 to 7 in Namibia in 2000 was 91.3 percent. However, in 
Namibia it was decided to exclude certain learners namely, learners in schools with less 
than fifteen Grade 6 learners, learners in “inaccessible” schools, and learners in special 
schools. A two-stage cluster sampling was employed using approximately equal size 
clusters stratified into the 13 educational regions, which led to a final sample of 5048 
learners and 275 schools (Makuwa, 2005).  
The HLM6.0 program is used in this study to partition the total variance in 
mathematics scores into its within- and between-school components. The HLM framework 
was developed during the 1980s by Aitkin & Longford (1986), DeLeeuw & Kreft (1986), 
Goldstein (1987), Mason et al. (1983) and Raudenbusk & Bryk (1986). As explained by 
Raudenbush & Bryk (1995), these procedures share two core features. First, they enable 
researchers to formulate and test explicit statistical models for processes occurring within 
and between educational units, thereby resolving the problem of aggregation bias under 
appropriate assumptions. Second, these methods enable specification of appropriate error 
structures, including random intercepts and random coefficients, which can solve the 
 71
problem of misestimated precision that characterized previous conventional linear models 
and hindered their capacity to test hypotheses1.  
Among the empirical works using this approach on international survey data is the 
study by Lamb & Fullarton (2002) which compared mathematics achievement in Australia 
and the U.S. using the HLM on TIMSS data. The results found that classroom differences 
accounted for about one-third of the variation in student achievement in the U.S. and over 
one-quart in Australia. Most of the classroom variation in both countries was due to 
compositional and organizational factors, very little due to differences between teachers. 
Moreover, Howie (2002, 2005) and Gustafsson (2007) used HLM on TIMSS and 
SACMEQ data, respectively, to understand school production in South Africa. Howie 
(2002, 2005) applied multilevel analysis (2002, 2005) on TIMSS data to show that 
significant predictors of between-school variations include pupils’ performance in the 
English test, pupils’ SES (to a lesser extent), pupils’ self concept, pupils’ perception of the 
importance of mathematics, their exposure to English, how pupils’ math teachers perceive 
their professional status, pupils’ math teachers beliefs about mathematics, the location of 
the school, the extent to which English is used in the classroom, the amount of time 
teachers spend working and the amount of time teachers spend in lesson planning. More 
recently, Gustafsson (2007) applied HLM to South Africa’s SACMEQ II data and found 
that physical infrastructure, textbooks, nutrition budgets, correct allocation of teaching and 
management time in schools, less learner repetition, and better teaching methodologies are 
important factors of variations in mathematics scores within and between South African 
schools. This last study respects the theoretical steps of multilevel analysis more reliably 
than Howie’s works but does not include any language related variable. 
The theoretical framework of HLM modeling applied in the present study is the one 
derived from Bryk & Raudenbush (1988) and defined by Hox (1995) consisting in 5 steps: 
(1) the Null Model; (2) the estimation of the fixed effects of the within-school model; (3) 
the estimation of the variance components of the within-school model; (4) the exploration 
of between-school effects; and (5) the estimation of the cross-level interactions between 
the within- and between-school variables. Note that relevance to the Namibian context, 
correlations with test scores and correlations between input variables were taken into 
                                                 
1 Lynch, Sabol, Planty & Shelly (2002) confirm the strength of HLM models compared to other multilevel 
models to produce superior unbiased estimates of coefficients and robust standard errors even when the 
assumptions required by OLS are violated. 
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account in the selection of all the parameters retained for this model. Table 1 displays the 
descriptive statistics relative to each parameter.  
 
Results 
 
The ull Model 
 
The first step in fitting an HLM model is to analyze a model with no explanatory 
variables. The output variable is pupil’s total raw score in mathematics at the SACMEQ 
test (MATOTP). The SACMEQ II Mathematics test is composed of three domains, namely 
(1) number (i.e. operations and number line, square roots, rounding and place value, 
significant figures, fractions, percentages, and rations); (2) measurement (i.e. 
measurements related to distance, length, area, capacity, money, and time); and (3) space-
data (i.e. geometric shapes, charts and data tables)2.  
This intercept-only model is defined by: 
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Hence, 
 
ijjij RUy ++= 000µ .                            (2) 
 
In this intercept-only model, which is the null model of our analysis, the base coefficient 
0jβ  is defined as the mean mathematics score in school j. It is a standard one-way random 
effects ANOVA model where schools are a random factor with varying numbers of 
students in each school sample (Bryk & Raudenbush, 1988, p.75).  
Whereas the within-school variance )var( ijR , i.e. the variability in student 
mathematics scores around their respective school means, is estimated to 25.556, the 
between-school variance )var()var( 00 jjU β= , i.e. the variability among school means, is 
                                                 
2 For a detailed overview of the levels and items composing the SACMEQ II Mathematics test, see the 
blueprint in Makuwa (2005, p. 31). 
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estimated to 36.020. Consequently, the intra-school correlation ρ, i.e. the ratio of the 
between-school variance over the sum of the between- and within-school variances, is 
.585, which implies that approximately 58.5 percent of the variance in mathematics scores 
occurs between schools. This result confirms the proportion of between-school variations 
estimated by Makuwa (2005) in Namibian mathematics and reading scores, namely 
approximately 60 percent between-school variation against 40 percent within-school 
variation. What remains to be done is to explain these variations by fitting a model with the 
highest explanatory propension.  
The Full Maximum Likelihood (FML) estimation method is used to calculate the 
value of deviance of this intercept-only model, which is a measure of the degree of misfit 
of the model (McCullagh & Nelder, 1989; Hox, 1995). We get a deviance of 31575.86 
(number of estimated parameters = 3). Each of the following steps of this HLM analysis 
will now aim at fitting a model with a lower deviance value.  
 
The Within-School Model: Unconditional Model 
 
The next phase is to analyze a model with pupil-level (within-school) explanatory 
variables fixed. This implies that the corresponding variance components of the slopes are 
fixed to zero. This fixed within-school model yields: 
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where the number of within-school explanatory variables is p = 1,…,n.  
This model identifies five explanatory variables (i.e. six parameters when including 
the intercept namely, the base score): 
EGLISH is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the pupil speaks English 
sometimes or always at home and the value of 0 if never. This variable aims at exploring 
the role played by the home language in achievement in a country applying a bilingual 
education policy based on mother-tongue instruction in the early phase of primary 
education before transiting to English in Grade 5 upwards. It is nevertheless important to 
highlight that because of the nature of the question – “How often do you speak English at 
home?” – inconsistency in the responses is plausible. For instance, the fact that 76.9 
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percent of the sampled pupils answered that they speak sometimes or all the time English 
at home does not mean that English is the mother-tongue of 76.9 percent of that 
population. In reality, English is the mother-tongue of only .56 percent of the Namibian 
population (Gordon, 2005). Moreover, no indication is provided about the nature and the 
level of communication in English that is occurring at home. Hence, this home language 
parameter should NOT be interpreted as a proxy of mother-tongue rather as a proxy of the 
linguistic home background of the pupil. 
FEMALE takes the value of 1 if the pupil is a girl and the value of 0 if the pupil is a 
boy. Entering a gender parameter aims at addressing potential gender gaps in mathematics 
achievement. In the present case, although the mean mathematics score for boys (= 18.86) 
is very close to the one for girls (= 18.25) the existence of very high variance for each 
group (66.41 for boys and 56.45 for girls) justifies further exploration.  
SES is a computed variable measuring the pupil’s SES (in terms of parents’ 
education, possessions at home, light, wall, roof, floor) that takes values between 1 and 15. 
Although the link between social background and achievement has been demonstrated to 
be less strong within-school in less developed countries than in industrial countries (see 
Heyman & Loxley, 1983; Saha, 1983; Fuller, 1987), it is still essential to include it in our 
analysis to avoid missing any explanation of between-school variations. 
RATOTP is the pupil’s total raw score in reading at the SACMEQ test. The reading 
test scores serve here as a proxy of English language proficiency (see Geary et al., 1997; 
Valverde, 1984; Collier, 1992; Ehindero, 1980; Yip et al., 2003; Clarkson & Galbraith, 
1992). Note that the strong correlation expected between RATOTP and EGLISH is 
present in our sample with a significance at the .01 level (2-tailed) and that the mean 
reading score of pupils who never speak English at home (= 29.86) is, again as expected, 
less than the mean score of pupils speaking sometimes or all the time English at home (= 
35.00).  
Finally, REPEAT is a dummy variable taking the value of 1 if the pupil has 
repeated at least one class and 0 if not. It provides information on the learning 
facilities/difficulties of the pupil and serves thereby as a proxy of the pupil’s academic 
background when combined with RATOTP (Bryk & Raudenbush, 1988). In our sample the 
mean mathematics score of grade repeating pupils is 16.66 compared to 20.55 for pupils 
on-track with much larger variance among the first (= 87.95) than among the latter group 
(= 29.18).  
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The predictors SES and REPEAT are centered around their respective group mean. 
Figures 2.1-2.5 present the Stem & Leaf plots of Mathematics scores by each parameter. 
Each figure shows the existence of large variations between and/or within groups, which 
justify the conduct of the present HLM analysis on these parameters to investigate the 
source of this variance. 
Replacing each parameter by its label-value in equation (3) we get: 
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The final estimation of these fixed effects with robust standard errors is displayed 
in Table 2. It appears that the most significant parameters are the pupil’s mean 
mathematics score, gender and reading raw score. The slopes’ signs show that, whereas 
being a girl has an overall negative impact on mathematics scores, a high mean 
mathematics score in the school attended and a high individual reading score have a 
positive impact on individual mathematics scores. The lack of statistical significance of the 
EGLISH, SES and REPEAT parameters is however not strong enough to justify at this 
stage a removal from the model. So far, what the model shows is that speaking English at 
home and a high SES background have a positive impact on mathematics achievement, 
which confirms the theory. According to previous research on developing countries 
(Heyneman & Loxley, 1983; Saha, 1983; Fuller, 1987; etc.), it is expected that SES and 
REPEAT will remain non-significant.  
Moreover, grade repetition has a negative impact on mathematics achievement, 
which confirms the conclusions reached by Verspoor (2006) in his report for ADEA. 
However, before claiming that this result either invalidates or confirms the assumption that 
repetition has a negative effect on pupil’s achievement improvement, it is important to 
highlight that the SACMEQ dataset does not provide for any longitudinal data. This lack 
implies that it is impossible to know whether the pupil who repeated a grade did improve 
its mathematics score compared to the previous year or not. All we know from the present 
analysis is that, overall, pupils who have repeated a grade perform less well than their non-
repeating peers. Hence, combined with the RATOTP parameter, this gives us an idea of the 
role of the educational background of the pupil on mathematics scores at a fixed date t, 
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with a higher mathematics achievement when the pupil is on school track (no repetition) 
and highly proficient in English.  
The deviance of this model is 30002.99 (number of estimated parameters = 8) 
which means an improvement from the null model. This fixed model explains 61.7 percent 
of the total variance in mathematics scores. 
The third step consists now in assessing whether the slope of any of the explanatory 
variables has a significant variance component between schools. The model considered is: 
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Replacing the parameters by their label name in equation (4) yields: 
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The testing of random slopes variations is done on a one-by-one basis. The 
deviance is now equal to 29663.63 (number of estimated parameters = 28), which implies a 
further improvement from to the null model. Table 2 presents all the results for the within-
school explanatory model unconditioned by the between-school variables. 
As explained by Raudenbush & Bryk (1987; 1988; 1992; 1995), the unconditional 
model is particularly valuable because it provides estimates of the total parameter 
variances and covariances among the βpj. When expressed as correlations they describe the 
general structure among these within-school effects. Table 2 shows that a high base level 
of achievement is associated with less grade repetition (r = .974), higher reading scores (r 
= .915), higher SES (r = .602), and male pupils (r = .650) who do not have English as 
home language (r = .192). There is also a substantial association between pupil high SES 
and academic achievement (with a high negative correlation between SES and grade 
repetition (r = .624) and a positive correlation with reading achievement (r = .278)). 
Moreover, HLM derives an indicator of the reliabilities of the random effects by 
comparing the estimated parameter variance in each regression coefficient, var(βij), to the 
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total variance in the ordinary least square estimates. These results are also displayed in 
Table 2. As expected, the base score is rather reliable, .788, and the regression coefficients 
are less reliable ranging from a low of .036 for pupils’ SES to a high .315 for reading raw 
score. This relatively low reliability may express the fact that much of the observed 
variability among schools in regression slopes is due to sampling error that can not be 
explained by within-school factors.  
Finally, the results of the homogeneity-of-variance tests provide statistical evidence 
of significant variation within schools in each of the six random regression coefficients 
with a very high Chi-square statistic (417.13) with 233 d.f.. The probability of the observed 
variability in these coefficients, under a homogeneity hypothesis, is less than .001 for β0, 
and β4 and less than .20 for β5. Hence, it appears that schools vary significantly in the 
degree to which achievement in mathematics depends on the child’s reading score and 
repetition status, i.e. on the child’s academic background, which confirms the findings by 
Raudenbush & Bryk (1988). Despite marginal significance, the pupil’s gender, SES and 
home language status, are still retained as random parameters because of previously 
reported school effects (i.e. between-school variability) on each of them. 
 
The Between-School Model: Conditional Model 
 
Next, the higher level explanatory variables qjZ  (i.e., school-level factors) are 
added to equation (4) to examine whether these variables explain between-school variation 
in the dependent variable. This addition yields: 
 
 ijOjpijpjqjqpijpij RUXUZXy +++++= 0000 µµµ ,                        (5) 
 
with q between-school explanatory variables Z, q = 1,…,m.  
The between-school variables add information about the quality of teaching and the 
learning environment. In this model q = 11 and the Zqj include the following class-room 
and school parameters:  
TOTEROL which measures the size of the school in term of total enrolment;  
PTRATIO providing the pupil-teacher ratio in each mathematics class;  
STYPE, a dummy variable taking the value of 1 when the school is governmental 
and 0 when private;  
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SLOC, a dummy variable taking the value of 1 when the school is situated in an 
urban area and 0 when in a rural or isolated area;  
PRACAD, a measure of the proportion of pupils on track (no grade repetition) in 
each school j;  
DISCLIM which measures the overall discipline climate of the school. It is 
computed as the average value of the following dummy variables: pupil arrive late, pupil 
absenteeism, pupil skip class, pupil dropout, pupil classroom disturbance, pupil cheating, 
pupil language, pupil vandalism, pupil theft, pupil bullying pupils, pupil bullying staff, 
pupil injure staff, pupil sexually harass pupils, pupil sexually harass teachers, pupil drug 
abuse, pupil alcohol abuse, pupil fights, teacher arrive late, teacher absenteeism, teacher 
skip classes, teacher bully pupils, teacher harass sexually teachers, teacher harass sexually 
pupils, teacher language, teacher drug abuse, and teacher alcohol abuse. Each variable 
takes the value of 1 if the answer is “never”; and 0 if the answer is “sometimes/often”. 
LGMTY, a dummy variable taking the value of 1 when 40 percent or more of the 
pupils speak English at home in school j and the value of 0 when less than 40 percent never 
speak English at home. This computation follows Raudenbush & Bryk’s (1988) 
computation of racial minority in the U.S. context.  
MSES, the mean SES in school j;  
TSEX taking the value of 1 when the mathematics teacher is a female and the value 
of 0 when a male;  
TSATPLR taking the value of 1 when the mathematics teacher considers the 
pupils’ learning as very important and 0 when not important or of some importance; and  
MATOTT, the mathematics raw score of the teacher, which serves as a proxy of the 
teacher’s qualifications based on its mastery of the subject. 
The predictors TOTEROL, PTRATIO, MSES and MATOTT are centered around 
their respective grand mean. 
Replacing these variable labels into equation (5) yields the following model: 
 79
ijjijj
jijjjijjijj
ijjjj
jjj
jjjj
jj
ijjij
jijijijij
RUREPEATU
RATOTPRATOTPUSESSESUFEMALEU
EGLISHUMATOTTMATOTTTSATPLR
TSEXMSESMSESLGMTY
DISCLIMPRACADSLOCSTYPE
PTRATIOPTRATIOTOTEROLTOTEROL
REPEATRATOTPRATOTP
SESSESFEMALEEGLISHMATOTP
+++
−+−++
+−++
+−++
++++
−+−
++−+
−+++=
••
•
•
••
•
•
05
432
1011010
090807
06050403
0201
5040
30201000
)()(
)(
)(
)()(
)(
)(
µµ
µµµ
µµµµ
µµ
µµ
µµµµ
 
      (5’) 
 
The FML estimation method is again used to test (with the global chi-square test) 
the improvement of fit of the new model. After adding the between-school explanatory 
parameters, the deviance is 29495.19 (degree of freedom = 39), which improves again the 
null model. Table 3 presents the results for this conditional model. What appears from that 
analysis is that the proportion of students on track, the mean pupil’s SES and the level of 
mathematics of the math teacher explain very significantly (significant at the .001 level) 
variations in the individual mathematics scores. At a lesser level, the school’s overall 
disciplinary climate and the type of school also play a significant role, with t-values of 
1.812 and -1.281 respectively. The negative slope of the type of school indicates that 
private schools perform on average better than governmental schools.  
 
The Final Model: Cross-Level Interaction Model 
 
Finally, cross-level interactions between explanatory school-level variables and 
those pupil-level explanatory variables that had significant slopes variation in equation (4) 
are added. This last addition leads to the full model formulated in equation (6): 
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which yields equation (6’): 
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Here again, the FML estimation method is used to derive the global chi-square test 
to formally test the improvement of fit. The deviance is now 29354.015 (number of 
estimated parameters = 44), which means a 7.57 percent improvement compared to the null 
model. The OLS regression of the full explanatory model improves the capacity of 
explanation of the variations in mathematics scores by almost 2 percent (R2 = .635 
percent). The results of the final explanatory model are displayed in Table 4. 
Table 4 shows that the base score differences between private and public schools 
(STYPE) disappear once the school location (SLOC), the portion of pupils on track 
(PRACAD), the mean SES (MSES) of the school and the mathematics score of the math 
teacher (MATOTT) are taken into account. The negative slope of the school type means 
that greater mathematics achievement is associated with private schools situated in urban 
areas, with a high proportion of pupils on track, a high average SES and a good mastery of 
mathematics by the teacher. The effect of the school type (public or private) on the 
attraction of home English speaking pupils disappears once the disciplinary climate 
(DISCLIM) is taken into account. Home-English speaking pupils tend to attend private 
schools where the disciplinary climate is safer. Furthermore, low average school SES tends 
to be more associated with boys than with girls (FEMALE), and pupil’s SES is associated 
to important disciplinary problems. Greater reading scores are associated with public 
schools if they are of small size (TOTEROL), if the proportion of pupils on track is high 
and the school average SES is not too low. In addition, great reading scores are also 
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associated with a good mastery of mathematics by the math teacher. Finally, there seems to 
be less grade repetition in public schools and in schools with a lower average SES. 
The last panel of Table 4 compares the residual parameter variances from the 
explanatory model with the total parameter variances estimated in the unconditional model. 
The proportion reduction in these parameter variances can be interpreted as an indicator of 
the power of the explanatory model. The fitted model accounts for a substantial percentage 
of the variance (percent of R²) of each within-school parameters ranging from 33.94 
percent for EGLISH to 72.72 percent for RATOTP.  
Finally, the most rigorous test of the explanation power of the final model involves 
acceptance of the homogeneity of residual variance hypotheses, i.e. “after modeling each 
βjk as a function of some school-level variables, is there evidence of residual parameter 
variation in the βjk that remains unaccounted?” (Bryk & Raudenbush, 1988, p. 79). Table 4 
shows evidence of significant residual variation (high Chi-square) in base achievement 
score and academic background (RATOTP and REPEAT). Moreover, the homogeneity 
hypothesis for the home language (p > .500), gender (p > .500) and social differentiation (p 
> .500) are still not sustained3. This means that the remaining variance in βpj  might be due 
to sampling variance arising because pjβˆ  measures βpj with error (i.e. pjpjpj R+= ββˆ ) and 
because of the existence of correlation between Xpij and Upj (i.e. { } 0≠pijpj XUE ) (see 
Pedhazur, 1982, for a comprehensive discussion of measurement errors, specification 
errors, and multicollinearity). In microeconomics modeling, the existence of a “non-zero” 
correlation between Xpij and Upj  violates one of the basic validity conditions. It is however 
a very common issue in most empirical applications and especially in multilevel linear 
models (Billy, 2001). Indeed, it implies that pupils’ performance and school quality can be 
positively correlated, which means that the residual variability across schools with respect 
to Upj, remaining after accounting for the observable heterogeneity Xpij, understates the true 
variability of Upj . For instance, pupils with better than average characteristics might be 
better informed and thus more able to choose the best school (“pupils self-selection”), and 
schools that attract better pupils (because of a better location,  better status – private vs. 
public – or better organizational characteristics) also tend to attract better teachers 
(“teachers self-selection”). Moreover, schools with better teachers and management are in 
                                                 
3 The test of homogeneity of level-1 variance gives a Chi-square statistic of 417.13 for 233 d.f. and a P-value 
= .000.   
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a position to recruit better students and “weed out” less promising cases (“creaming”), as it 
is the case for Namibian private schools (see Grilli & Rampichini, 2007; Fielding & Steele, 
2007; Peng, 2007; Frank, 2005; Rettore & Martini, 2001; Mason, 2001; and Willms & 
Raudenbush, 1989; for methodological discussions and statistical proposals or attempts to 
solve this endogeneity bias).  
In the case of this paper, the existence of potential endogeneity bias has partially 
been accounted for by the computation of the indicator of the reliabilities of random 
effects. This indicator examines the reliability of the ordinary least squares (OLS) estimate 
and the correlation among the model’s parameters at the pupil and school levels. The 
reliability of the level-2 outcome variables (which are the input variables of level-1) is 
expected to ensure that the data can detect systematic relations between within- and 
between-school variables (Raudenbush & Bryk, 1992). The reliabilities depend on two 
factors: first, the degree to which the true underlying pupil parameters vary from school to 
school; and, second, the precision with which each school regression equation is estimated. 
For each school at Level-2, 
 
reliability
][
)ˆ(
2
jk
pj
tσττ
τ
β
ββ
β
+
=                    (7) 
 
is the reliability of the schools’ sample mean as an estimate of its true mean. The average 
of these reliabilities across schools presented in Tables 2-4 provide summary measures of 
the reliability of the school means (Xiao, 2001). 
This indicator demonstrates weak reliability of all regression coefficients, except 
j0βˆ , and a decrease of overall reliability between the final model (Table 4) and the 
unconditional model (Table 2), which confirms the presence of potential underestimation 
bias of the size of the random effects on the outcome variable. However, it is worth 
noticing that the bias is small when the number of Level-1 observations is large and the 
number of Level-2 groups is small (Miller & Phillips, 2002), which is exactly the case in 
our study (5048 pupils in Level-1 and 275 schools in Level-2).  
Hence, although the sampling error and endogeneity bias should be accounted for 
when interpreting the results presented in this paper, it is reasonable to assume that the bias 
size is not problematic in this application.  
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Conclusions 
 
In sum, this HLM analysis provides empirical support for the contention that 
academic organization and normative environment of schools have a substantial impact on 
the social distribution of achievement within them. At the individual level, the base 
mathematics score of the school, followed by the academic background of the pupil 
(RATOTP and REPEAT), its gender as well as its home language play a statistically 
significant role in the individual mathematics achievement. The only non-significant 
parameter is the SES of the pupil. At the school level, the analysis shows that, overall, 
individual mathematics achievement is facilitated in schools with a higher proportion of 
students on-track (RATOTP), a higher average SES and a strong mastery of the subject by 
the mathematics teacher (MATOTT). Pupils also tend to perform better in private schools 
than in governmental schools (STYPE) which confirms the observed tendency for higher 
achievement in schools with less disciplinary problems (DISCLIM). The home language 
parameter looses of its significance when comparing between-school variations which 
could be due to the specification problems of the variable EGLISH as explained earlier. 
However, the language proficiency parameter (RATOTP) increases even more its 
explanatory capacity at the between-school level which makes it one of the most 
significant explanatory variables of this model and confirms the role played by language 
skills in learning achievement.  
The policy implications of these results are a necessary improvement of the quality 
of resource allocations in teacher training to improve the subject mastery of teachers and, 
more generally, in the development of better supervision structures to improve the 
disciplinary climate in governmental schools. Moreover, it is important to investigate 
further the potential negative direct (on the targeted pupil) and indirect (via peer-effect) 
role played by high repetition rates in primary education. Lastly, the positive results 
reached by this study on the role played by linguistic parameters on learning achievement 
should guide decision makers in their search for optimal solutions for school effectiveness. 
Hence, this study wants to underscore the need for more and better information about 
pupils’ and teachers’ home language and mother-tongue in further international surveys in 
Africa to investigate deeper the actual efficiency of bilingual and multilingual education 
programs on overall learning achievement. 
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Finally, although assumed to have a potential positive effect on the fit of the final 
model in view of the HIV/AIDS pandemic affecting the whole country, the health status of 
the pupils could not be accounted for by this study. Because less than half4 of the pupils 
sampled (=2199 out of 5048) answered the question related to the reasons of their 
absenteeism (illness, work, family or fee not paid), and because of the very unspecific 
nature of the question, this parameter could not be included in this analysis. Moreover, in 
absence of information about the type of illness or the duration of absenteeism in the 
SACMEQ II dataset, the choice of this parameter as a proxy of the potential role of 
HIV/AIDS on learning achievement would have been highly questionable. Further 
research should therefore attempt, first of all, to collect appropriate data on this 
phenomenon in the frame of larger international surveys such as SACMEQ and, second, to 
include this parameter in an HLM analysis to respond to the concerns raised by many 
African Governments about the negative effects of the HIV/AIDS pandemic on school 
effectiveness. 
 
                                                 
4 The parameters retained in this HLM analysis suffered no missing data, except for the outcome variable. In 
the case of the total raw mathematics scores of the pupils, 58 cases (1.1 percent) were missing because of 
non-completion of the test but these data could be recomputed by estimating a probabilistic value from the 
school mean and the grand mean.  
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Table 2 
Unconditional Model 
Fixed Effects Estimated 
Coefficient 
Robust 
Standard 
Error 
t-Ratio 
Base score, µ0  
EGLISH, µ1 
FEMALE, µ2  
SES, µ3 
RATOTP, µ4 
REPEAT, µ5 
18.578 
.397 
-.673 
.045 
.252 
-.381 
.433 
.163 
.125 
.029 
.010 
.139 
42.875 
2.441 
-5.349 
1.541 
22.562 
   -2.742 
Random Parameter Estimated 
Parameter 
Variance 
Degrees of 
Freedom 
Chi-square P-Value 
Base score, β0 
EGLISH, β1  
FEMALE, β2 
SES, β3 
RATOTP, β4 
REPEAT β5 
43.570 
.439 
.682 
.012 
.011 
.880 
233 
233 
233 
233 
233 
233 
1335.669 
216.276 
242.089 
215.688 
409.413 
252.234 
.000 
>.500 
.327 
>.500 
.000 
.185 
Correlation Matrix  
of Random Effects 
β0 β1 β2 β3 β4 
Base score, β0 
EGLISH, β1  
FEMALE, β2 
SES, β3 
RATOTP, β4 
REPEAT β5 
 
-.192 
-.650 
.602 
.915 
-.974 
 
 
-.540 
-.601 
.118 
.193 
 
 
 
.092 
-.864 
.617 
 
 
 
 
.278 
-.624 
 
 
 
 
 
-.866 
Reliability of Within-School Random Effects 
Base score, β0 
EGLISH, β1  
FEMALE, β2 
SES, β3 
RATOTP, β4 
REPEAT β5 
.788 
.050 
.119 
.036 
.315 
.127 
 Notes: All estimates for two-level models reported in this article were computed using the HLM6.0 program. 
The reliability estimates reported above are based on only 234 of 270 units that had sufficient data for 
computation. Fixed effects and variance components are based on all the data. 
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Table 3 
Between-School Effects: Conditional Model 
Fixed Effects 
Estimated 
Coefficient 
Robust 
Standard 
Error t-Ratio 
Base score, β0 
    ITERCEPT(*) 
    TOTEROL 
    PTRATIO 
    STYPE 
    SLOC 
    PRACAD 
    DISCLIM 
    LGMTY 
    MSES 
    TSEX 
    TSATPLR 
    MATOTT 
EGLISH, β1  
   ITERCEPT(*) 
FEMALE, β2 
    ITERCEPT(*) 
SES, β3 
    ITERCEPT(*) 
RATOTP, β4 
    ITERCEPT(*) 
REPEAT β5 
    ITERCEPT(*) 
 
17.5982 
-.0004 
.0207 
-2.4568 
.4107 
5.0594 
2.0183 
-.2038 
.8508 
.3916 
-.4477 
.1051 
 
.3433 
 
-.6484 
 
.0527 
 
.2695 
 
-.3063 
 
1.977 
.001 
.0325 
1.918 
.511 
.966 
1.114 
.667 
.127 
.375 
.569 
.030 
 
.162 
 
.127 
 
.030 
 
.011 
 
.133 
 
8.901 
-.464 
.594 
-1.281 
.804 
5.239 
1.812 
-.306 
6.668 
1.043 
-.787 
3.548 
 
2.123 
 
-5.106 
 
1.758 
 
24.184 
 
-2.299 
Random Parameter 
Estimated 
Parameter 
Variance 
Degrees of 
Freedom Chi-square P-Value 
Base score, β0 
EGLISH, β1  
FEMALE, β2 
SES, β3 
RATOTP, β4 
REPEAT, β5 
17.300 
.383 
.740 
.012 
.011 
.716 
222 
233 
233 
233 
233 
233 
651.016 
216.635 
242.144 
216.462 
397.302 
252.032 
.000 
>.500 
.326 
>.500 
.000 
.187 
Reliability of Within-School Random Effects 
Base score, β0 
EGLISH, β1  
FEMALE, β2 
SES, β3 
RATOTP, β4 
REPEAT β5 
.615 
.044 
.128 
.037 
.318 
.106 
 Notes: (*) ITERCEPT corresponds to the base score.  
The reliability estimates reported above are based on only 234 of 270 units that had sufficient data for 
computation. Fixed effects and variance components are based on all the data. 
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Table 4 (1/2) 
Final Explanatory Model of Mathematics Achievement 
Fixed Effects  
Estimated 
Coefficient 
Robust 
Standard Error t-Ratio 
Base score, β0 
    ITERCEPT 
    STYPE 
    SLOC 
    PRACAD 
    MSES 
    MATOTT 
EGLISH, β1  
    ITERCEPT 
    STYPE 
    DISCLIM 
FEMALE, β2 
    ITERCEPT 
    MSES 
SES, β3 
    ITERCEPT 
    DISCLIM 
RATOTP, β4 
    ITERCEPT 
    TOTEROL 
    STYPE 
    PRACAD 
    MSES 
    MATOTT  
REPEAT β5 
    ITERCEPT 
    STYPE 
    MSES 
     
 
 
19.799 
-4.568 
.210 
6.405 
1.392 
.147 
 
-1.786 
2.247 
-.029 
 
-.675 
-.237 
 
-.169 
.436 
 
.091 
-.000029 
.061 
.213 
.018 
.004 
 
-1.706 
1.423 
-.256 
 
2.639 
2.704 
.519 
1.088 
.145 
.032 
 
1.352 
1.333 
.651 
 
.119 
.053 
 
.082 
.165 
 
.044 
.000024 
.039 
.049 
.004 
.001 
 
.814 
.833 
.059 
 
7.501 
-1.689 
.405 
5.884 
9.568 
4.585 
 
-1.321 
1.686 
-.045 
 
-5.673 
-4.442 
 
-2.054 
2.636 
 
2.037 
-1.215 
1.553 
4.326 
4.390 
3.552 
 
-2.095 
1.707 
-4.359 
  Reliability of Within-School Random Effects 
Base score, β0 
EGLISH, β1 
 FEMALE, β2 
SES, β3  
RATOTP, β4 
REPEAT β5 
 .576 
.034 
.061 
.021 
.133 
.051 
 
 
9
3
T
a
b
le
 4
 (
2
/2
) 
F
in
a
l 
E
x
p
la
n
a
to
ry
 M
o
d
el
 o
f 
M
a
th
em
a
ti
cs
 A
ch
ie
v
em
en
t 
R
an
d
o
m
 E
ff
ec
ts
 
 
E
st
im
at
ed
 
P
ar
am
et
er
 V
ar
ia
n
ce
 
D
eg
re
es
 o
f 
F
re
ed
o
m
 
C
h
i-
sq
u
ar
e 
P
-V
al
u
e 
B
a
se
 s
co
re
, 
β
0
 
E

G
L
IS
H
, 
β
1
  
F
E
M
A
L
E
, 
β
2
 
S
E
S
, 
β
3
 
R
A
T
O
T
P
, 
β
4
 
R
E
P
E
A
T
, 
β
5
 
 
1
4
.4
9
4
 
.2
9
0
 
.3
2
3
 
.0
0
7
 
.0
0
3
 
.3
2
1
 
2
2
8
 
2
3
1
 
2
3
2
 
2
3
2
 
2
2
8
 
2
3
1
 
5
5
4
.2
4
5
 
2
1
3
.2
0
3
 
2
3
0
.7
9
0
 
2
1
4
.0
3
6
 
2
7
5
.3
7
4
 
2
4
1
.3
3
8
 
.0
0
0
 
>
.5
0
0
 
>
.5
0
0
 
>
.5
0
0
 
.0
1
7
 
.3
0
7
 
M
O
D
E
L
 
P
er
ce
n
ta
g
e 
o
f 
V
ar
ia
n
ce
 E
x
p
la
in
ed
 
B
as
e 
sc
o
re
 
E
N
G
L
IS
H
 
F
E
M
A
L
E
 
S
E
S
 
R
A
T
O
T
P
 
R
E
P
E
A
T
 
v
ar
(β
0
) 
%
R
² 
v
ar
(β
1
) 
%
R
² 
v
ar
(β
2
) 
%
R
² 
v
ar
(β
3
) 
%
R
² 
v
ar
(β
4
) 
%
R
² 
v
ar
(β
5
) 
%
R
² 
U
n
co
n
d
it
io
n
al
 
4
3
.5
7
0
 
…
 
.4
3
9
 
…
 
.6
8
2
 
…
 
.0
1
2
 
…
 
.0
1
1
 
…
 
.8
8
0
 
…
 
E
x
p
la
n
at
o
ry
 
1
4
.4
9
4
 
6
6
.7
3
 
.2
9
0
 
3
3
.9
4
 
.3
2
3
 
5
2
.6
4
 
.0
0
7
 
4
1
.6
7
 
.0
0
3
 
7
2
.7
2
 
.3
2
1
 
6
3
.5
2
 
N
o
te
s:
 (
*
) 
I
T
E
R
C
E
P
T
 c
o
rr
es
p
o
n
d
s 
to
 t
h
e 
b
as
e 
sc
o
re
. 
 
T
h
e 
re
li
ab
il
it
y
 e
st
im
at
es
 r
ep
o
rt
ed
 a
b
o
v
e 
ar
e 
b
as
ed
 o
n
 o
n
ly
 2
3
4
 o
f 
2
7
0
 u
n
it
s 
th
at
 h
ad
 s
u
ff
ic
ie
n
t 
d
at
a 
fo
r 
co
m
p
u
ta
ti
o
n
. 
F
ix
ed
 e
ff
ec
ts
 a
n
d
 v
ar
ia
n
ce
 c
o
m
p
o
n
en
ts
 a
re
 b
as
ed
 o
n
 a
ll
 
th
e 
d
at
a.
 
93 
 
 94
never sometimes/all the time
R:/ speaking English at home
0
20
40
60
80
S
C
R
:/
 p
u
p
il
 r
e
a
d
in
g
-a
ll
 t
o
ta
l 
ra
w
 s
c
o
re
2 729
3 624
4 694
4 712
4 778
4 796
2 529
4 797
2 606
2 495
5 026
4 970
5 028
5 027
5 024
5 023
4 715
740
1 430
4 725
2 516
4 757
2 358
 
Figure 1. English Proficiency by Home Language Stem-and-Leaf Plots 
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Figure 2.1 Mathematics Achievement by Home Language Stem-and-Leaf Plots 
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Figure 2.2 Mathematics Achievement by Pupil’s Gender Stem-and-Leaf Plots 
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Figure 2.3 Mathematics Achievement by Pupil’s SES Stem-and-Leaf Plots 
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Figure 2.4 Mathematics Achievement by English Proficiency Stem-and-Leaf Plots 
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Figure 2.5 Mathematics Achievement by Grade Repetition Stem-and-Leaf Plots 
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Abstract 
 
This paper focuses on the contributions from the positivist epistemological approach, 
endorsed by the economics of language and the economics of education, to study the 
returns to language skills, assuming that language competencies constitute key components 
of human capital. It presents results on economic returns to language skills in eight 
countries enrolled in the International Adult Literacy Survey (IALS) – Chile, Czech 
Republic, Denmark, Finland, Hungary, Italy, Norway and Italian-speaking Switzerland. 
The study shows commonalities between countries in terms of language skills valuing, 
beyond the type of language policy applied at the national level. In each of the eight 
countries compared, skills in a second language are estimated to be a major factor 
constraining positively wage opportunities.  
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1. Introduction 
 
At the dawn of the new millennium, debates on language policy are more and more 
focused on the role of multilingualism and multiculturalism in the globalization process. 
The complexity of this issue lies mainly in the fact that the process of globalization at the 
cultural level produces contradictory behaviors. As Stromquist & Monkman (2000) 
explain: 
 
While the world is becoming smaller and more homogeneous at some levels, in a variety of ways 
local cultures are making efforts to retain their identity and, in some cases, even to rediscover it 
(Stromquist & Monkman, 2000, p. 7). 
 
Hence, Cvetkovich & Kellner (1997) claim that: 
 
Although global forces can be oppressive and erode cultural traditions and identities they can 
also provide new material to rework one’s identity and can empower people to revolt against 
traditional forms and styles to create new, more emancipatory ones (Cvetkovitch & Kellner, 
1997, p. 10). 
 
This paradox is very well captured by Pattanyak (1984) in his overview of the different 
positions in the current debate:  
 
The dominant monolingual orientation is cultivated in the developed world and consequently 
two languages are considered a nuisance, three languages uneconomic and many languages 
absurd. In multilingual countries, many languages are facts of life; any restriction in the choice 
of language is a nuisance; and one language is not only uneconomic, it is absurd (Pattanyak, 
1984; quoted by Skutnabb-Kangas & Garcia, 1995, p. 221). 
 
In the face of this complicated climate, where, on the one hand, the labor market is 
required to homogenize to its maximum its communication tools (i.e. languages of trade) 
and, on the other hand, the national political leaders are fighting for the preservation of the 
cultural and linguistic identity of their people, the education sector serves as the mediator 
between these two parties[1]. Hence, the sociology of learning in schools is built on the 
assumption that a polity targeting sustainable-development needs to focus on providing 
                                                 
[1] Educationalists, such as Giddens, 1994, and Stromqvist & Monkman, 2000, are increasingly interested in 
the role of globalization in the re-conceptualization of knowledge. 
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children with the knowledge, skills and values needed to make them become competent 
adult members of the society (Broadfoot, 1994). And so, by definition, the type of 
language-in-education policy (if any) adopted by a government reflects its ambition to 
educate a skilled and attractive labor force. As Marland (1977) highlighted in his advocacy 
for language across the curriculum (LAC):  
 
If a school devotes thought and time to assisting language development, learning in all areas 
will be helped; if attention is given to language in the content and skill subjects, language 
development will be assisted powerfully by the context and purpose of those subjects (Marland, 
1977; quoted by Froese, 1994,  p. 3205). 
 
Building on the hypothesis that bilingual education programs favor cognitive learning, and 
thereby literacy (Jacob, 1994; Ogbu, 1994; Pease-Alvarez, 1994), and given the 
contradictory linguistic interpretations of globalization, the question of which languages to 
choose as part of a bilingual education policy confronts two main linguistics theorist 
groups, namely the ‘free-market’ theorists and the ‘green’ theorists. On the one hand, the 
‘free-market’ theory of unfettered capitalism defines linguistic geo-strategy as a race for 
‘market share’ ran by the governments representing the major international languages. On 
the other hand, the ‘green’ theory of ecological protection advocates for a linguistic geo-
strategy of “protection of endangered languages undertaken by linguists and by those 
interested in linguistic human rights” (Kibbee, 2003, p. 47).  
 
Although the emergence of this debate results from works in sociolinguistics and 
linguistics, this paper aims at showing that economics of education and economics of 
language contribute to this debate principally via their fundamental assumption that an 
optimal combination of languages exists for each labor market (Vaillancourt, 1982/1983, p. 
167). This hypothesis, which supports the ‘free-market’ theory, has inspired Vaillancourt 
(1980) and Lacroix & Vaillancourt (1980, 1981) to elaborate a framework transforming 
this demand for language skills into a demand for individuals embodying language skills, 
thereby allowing them to make predictions on the relative earnings of Anglophone and 
Francophone salaried in Quebec. A similar framework was used by Boulet (1980) to 
examine the situation in Montreal. In total, more than two dozen studies have been 
conducted since 1970 based on this hypothesis and using either a 1/100 sample drawn from 
the 1971 Census of Canada or data from large-scale surveys. Vaillancourt (1982/1983) 
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highlights that “[a]ll studies make use of regression analysis, usually linking the logarithm 
of earnings to individual characteristics such as education and age, in addition to language 
skills” (p. 168). This method is derived from the ‘mincerian’ specifications of human 
capital. The principle is to add to his Mincer’s (1974) specification of the link between 
income and its determinants, one or several variables denoting linguistic competences 
(Grin, 1999, p. 30). The inherent hypothesis is that the higher the level of language 
competences, the higher the wages. 
 
These studies have the advantage of coherently supporting the validity of the above 
framework to predict the relative returns to language skills, even when taking into account 
the level of knowledge of these languages (e.g., Boulet, & Castonguay, 1979; Chizwick & 
Miller, 1992; Fixman, 1990; Grenier & Vaillancourt, 1982; Grin, 1999; Sabourin, 1979; 
Veltman, Vaillancourt & Pes, 1980). On the other hand, their weakness lies in their use of 
datasets that are nationally designed and thereby not internationally comparative.  
 
The purpose of this paper is therefore to go beyond this limitation by testing the ‘free-
market’ theory on eight countries, using the database provided by the International Adult 
Literacy Survey (IALS), ran between 1994 and 1998. Three countries (Finland, Hungary 
and Norway) officially apply a bilingual education policy and five (Chile, Czech Republic, 
Denmark, Italy and Italian-speaking Switzerland) officially apply another type of 
language-in-education policy. Table I presents the language policy of all IALS countries 
covered by this study. Note that these countries have been selected among the twenty-one 
countries participating in the IALS, based on availability and reliability of data. 
 
Among the linguistic factors influencing wages, the level of literacy in the working 
language (which is assumed to be the national official language) and the number of 
languages spoken are retained for this study. One of the objectives is to test the assumption 
that proficiency in the national language is more significant to immigrants (measured as 
not born in country of survey) than to native individuals. Further, the number of languages 
spoken serves to test the assumption that globalization requires skills in foreign languages 
(free-market theory).  
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Building the hypotheses mainly on results found by previous studies in the United States 
and in Canada in the past twenty-five years (with the exception of the works by Grin in 
Switzerland), this study attempts to test their generalizability at the international level. 
Interestingly, the studies conducted so far show rather mixed results. For instance, some 
find that a variable measuring English proficiency is not statistically significant in 
influencing hourly wages. In the U.S., such findings include the studies by Borjas (1984) 
using the 1976 Survey of Income and Education (SIE) for various Hispanic groups, 
Reimers (1983, 1985) for males and females in the SIE data set, and Gwartney & Long 
(1978) and Carliner (1980) using Census data. In Canada, Bloom & Grenier (1992), 
Chizwick & Miller (1992), Grenier (1987), Robinson (1988), Shapiro & Stelcner (1987) 
and Vaillancourt (1992) failed to find strong language effects on earnings outside Quebec 
(where the returns to bilingualism in French and English are generally positive), 
confirming thereby the findings from the U.S.  
 
On the other hand, research by Grenier (1984), Kossoudji (1988), McManus et al. (1983), 
Rivera-Batiz (1990), Tainer (1988), have found significant positive effects of English 
language proficiency on earnings in the U.S. Moreover, in Canada, Christofides & 
Swidinsky (1998) have shown that, relative to the earnings of unilingual Anglophones, the 
returns to bilingualism have increased significantly between 1971 and 1991 in both Quebec 
and the Rest-of-Canada, which alters previous results. Further, Grin’s (1999) study on the 
returns to proficiency in a foreign language (namely, English) in Switzerland confirms a 
significant effect on earnings.  
 
Rivera-Batiz’s (1990) and Grin’s (1999) studies differ from the other studies in their use of 
test-based measurements of language proficiency, rather than self-assessed subjective 
measurements. The present study offers similar reliability for skills in the official national 
language(s) by using the test-based measurement of prose, document and quantitative 
literacy computed by the IALS. However, skills in foreign languages are based on self-
assessment.  
 
Because the aim of this study is to test the free-market theory, this paper addresses the 
following specific questions: 
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1) Does proficiency in the official national language(s) play a significant role on 
wages?  
2) Does this result differ by gender and between native and non-native individuals to 
the country of survey? 
3) Are language skills more rewarded in countries applying an official bilingual policy 
than in countries applying another type of language policy? 
 
2. The empirical model 
 
This study applies the following empirical human capital model, estimated separately for 
men and women, and native and non-native individuals in each country of the sample: 
 
ijkijkijk UXW +=
'log β , 
 
where ijkW  is the estimate of personal income from only wages, salary or self-employment 
in the year of the survey received by individual i of gender j, and place of birth k (i.e. in or 
not in country of survey); β  is a vector of coefficients to be estimated; ijkX  is a vector of 
human capital and demographic characteristics affecting wages; and ijkU  is a stochastic 
disturbance.  
 
In order to determine the role played by language proficiency on earnings, three human 
capital equations have been computed. The first one is a ‘standard’ human capital equation, 
where vector ijkX  includes two key explanatory variables. First of all, years of schooling, 
a7, as an indication of the impact of academic skills on earnings. Moreover, years of on-
the-job experience, proxied by the variable exper, measured as age minus years of 
schooling minus six[2], to incorporate the effect of non-academic skills on wages.  
 
The second human capital equation adds to the previous the scores received by individuals 
in literacy, as measured by the IALS. The IALS defines three domains of literacy: 
                                                 
[2] On average, compulsory education starts at the age of six at the international level, including in the 
countries of this sample. It is therefore commonly admitted to define exper as age minus years of schooling 
minus six (Rivera-Batiz, 1990).  
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a) Prose Literacy – the knowledge and skills needed to understand and use information from 
texts including editorials, news stories, poems, and fiction; 
b) Document literacy – the knowledge and skills required to locate and use information 
contained in various formats, including job applications, payroll forms, transportation 
schedules, maps, tables, and graphics; and 
c) Quantitative literacy – the knowledge and skills required to apply arithmetic operations, 
either alone or sequentially, to numbers embedded in printed materials, such as balancing a 
checkbook, calculating a tip, completing an order form, or determining the amount of 
interest on a loan from an advertisement (Statistics Canada, 2002, p. 15; italic in original). 
 
For each of these three scales (prose, document and quantitative), individuals are assigned 
scores, ranging from 0 to 500, according to how well they perform on a number of tasks of 
varying difficulty. The scale scores are in turn grouped into five empirically determined 
literacy levels, each of them implying an ability to cope with a particular subset of reading 
tasks. Variables prose, doc and quant provide the average score for prose literacy, 
document literacy and quantitative literacy respectively (see Table II for a definition of 
each level and score range).  
 
Finally, the third human capital equation adds skills in two languages, proxied by the 
dummy variable lang2, which equals 1 if the person can conduct a conversation in a 
foreign language in addition to the national official language, and zero otherwise. Although 
this variable is based on self-assessment, and can therefore not be considered as an 
evidence of bilingual proficiency, it helps measuring the significance given by the labor 
market to language competences beyond the official national language. 
 
Only individuals for whom non-zero wages are observed are retained for the analysis. This 
implies a non-random selection of cases, which biases the error term ijU . This selectivity 
bias problem could be solved with the two-stage sample selection bias correction 
procedure postulated by Heckman (1979).  
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3. Results 
 
The results for the countries of our sample are grouped by type of national language policy 
(bilingual and other types). Tables III-A and III-B depict the sample means for bilingual 
and non-bilingual countries respectively for the variables included in the analysis. Tables 
IV-A and IV-B show the results for native men and women in bilingual and non-bilingual 
countries respectively. Whenever possible, results have been computed for individuals 
born in another country than the country of survey to look for eventual differences of 
results with the individuals born in the country of survey.  
 
For comparison purposes, equation (1) presents the estimated coefficients when all 
variables on language skills are excluded from the wage equation. Equation (2) then shows 
the results when the variables in prose, document and quantitative literacy in the official 
national language are included. Finally, equation (3) presents the results including skills in 
two languages (see annex). Note that cases with negative adjusted R2 are not presented in 
these tables.  
 
Countries applying bilingual (or multilingual) policies are assumed to value skills in two 
languages more than countries applying other types of language policies. This implies that 
the significance of lang2 on wages is expected to be higher in bilingual countries. 
Conversely, proficiency in the official national language is expected to have a higher 
significance in countries valorizing their unique official language.  
 
First of all, the results presented in this paper show that the three human capital equations 
estimated in this study provide a sufficient percentage of explanation of variations in 
wages only for Finnish men and women born in Finland (between 12.2 and 13.8 percent), 
Norwegian men born in Norway (between 11.2 and 12.7 percent), Danish men born in 
Denmark (between 12.5 and 13.3 percent) and women leaving in Italy and born abroad (up 
to 21.9 percent). For all other cases, the low level of adjusted R2 highlights the need to 
refine the estimated equations. However, previous empirical studies applying the same 
Mincerian approach did not obtain higher explanation degrees, which allows us 
nevertheless to treat our results as valid.   
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In the two countries applying a national policy of bilingualism (Finland and Norway) 
linguistic skills, both in terms of literacy skills in the national official language and skills in 
a second language, have a significant effect on wages, as demonstrated by the increasing 
adjusted R2 when incorporating the linguistic variables. However, the weights estimated 
for pros, doc and quant are very small compared to the weights estimated for lang2. This 
shows that for individuals born in the country of residency and work, although they can 
influence the type of work and thereby the income range one is eligible for, literacy skills 
in the national official language are not a requirement for wage improvements. On the 
other hand, the weight estimated for second language skills goes pass the weights 
estimated for educational level and professional experience in both countries. It is however 
worth noticing that although Swedish is the second official language of Finland, 55 percent 
of the Finnish population has English as second language (41.7 percent speaks Swedish as 
second language). The same applies to Norway, with English being spoken by 93 percent 
of Bokmål-speaking population as the second language.  
 
Moreover, looking at the results for the six countries applying a national language policy 
other than bilingualism (Chile, Czech Republic, Denmark, Hungary, Italy and Italian-
speaking Switzerland), it appears that despite the explicative weakness of the model, the 
inclusion of language skill variables also improves the adjusted R2. It is interesting to see 
that skills in a second language are as praised by the labor market in non-bilingual 
countries as they are in bilingual countries and that the role played by literacy in the 
national official language varies strongly between countries and even between types of 
literacy skills. Furthermore, second language skills are more valued in women’s wages 
than in men’s wages in all countries of our sample except Switzerland (Italian-speaking 
part). These differences could be explained by the distribution of gender by type of 
professional occupation. 
 
When examining the nature of the second language spoken by the individuals of our 
sample it is striking to see that English comes first in Chile (58 percent) and Denmark (79 
percent), and second in Hungary after German (29 percent versus 52 percent) and in Italy 
after French (35 percent against 44 percent). The only exception to this trend in favor of 
English as common communication means are the Czech Republic, where 41 percent of 
the population still speaks Russian as second language before German (20 percent) - 
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English comes only in third position with 14 percent -, and the Italian-speaking 
Switzerland with 58 percent speaking the regional dialect, 24 percent speaking German, 
and 13 percent French[3] (only 1.5 percent for English). From this distribution of languages 
it is clear that the choice of the second language is more highly correlated to economic 
factors than the choice of the first language, which is still very much correlated to socio-
cultural and historical factors. This finding for second languages supports the free-market 
theory, which states that the choice of languages should be ruled by competitiveness.  
 
Finally, although one of the objectives of this study was to compare results for men and 
women according to their place of birth (assuming that immigrants would be included in 
the individuals not born in the country of survey), lack of valid data for individuals born 
outside the country of survey in all countries of our sample - except for Norway and the 
Italian-speaking Switzerland - hinders us from drawing any conclusions from that angle 
(see Tables III-A and III-B for sample means by gender and place of birth). In the case of 
Norway, none of the three human capital equations tested have the capacity to explain 
more than 0.5 percent of the variations in wages for men born abroad, and in the Swiss 
case, the inclusion of the linguistic variables diminishes the explanatory level of the model, 
implying that the sources of variations of wages of non-natives should be sought among 
other factors. 
 
4. Conclusions 
 
Rare study on economic returns to language skills conducted at the international level, this 
paper has made use of a test-based measure of literacy skills in national official language 
and self-assessment measure of competences in a second language to estimate the role 
played by language skills in explaining earnings in eight countries. This paper thereby 
contrasts with the previous literature in this field, which has used non-comparative national 
datasets.  
 
This analysis demonstrates the existence of commonalities between countries in terms of 
language skills valuing, which go beyond the type of language policy applied at the 
                                                 
[3] Together with Italian and Romansh, German and French are the official languages of Switzerland. 
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national level. In each of the eight countries compared, skills in a second language are 
estimated to be a major factor constraining positively wage opportunities. 
 
The initial objective of this empirical study was to test the free-market theory according to 
which ‘competitive’ bilingualism or multilingualism needs to prevail ‘ecological’ 
multilingualism. Based on the nature of the second languages spoken by our sample, and 
on their estimated economic return, this study validates fully the free-market theory. 
However, the returns to literacy skills in the official national language (assumed to be 
equal to the working language) were expected to be higher. The re-computation of literacy 
skills as an average of prose, document and quantitative literacy might alter this result in 
favor of the free-market theory, i.e. in favor of high skills in the language of the market. 
Finally, a suggestion for further research would be to add a control for the type of 
professional occupation in order to explain better the differences in returns to language 
skills by countries, genders, native vs. non-natives, and even individuals of a same group.   
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Table I Official language policy of the sample countries  
Country Language Policy 
Chile Mixed policy: Valorization of official language and Differentiate status (minority 
languages). Non-intervention. 
Czech Republic Mixed policy: Non-intervention (official language) and Sector policy (minority 
languages). 
Denmark Sector policy. 
Finland Bilingualism based on territorial personal rights. 
Hungary Non-intervention and sector policy (minority languages). 
Italy Unilingualism (valorization of the national official language).  
Norway (Bokmål) Bilingualism based on personal rights. 
Switzerland 
(Italian-speaking)  
Unilinguism (territorial borders between official languages). 
Source: Based on Leclerc (2001).  
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to
 
p
er
fo
rm
 
a 
si
n
g
le
 
o
p
er
at
io
n
. 
H
o
w
ev
er
, 
th
e 
o
p
er
at
io
n
s 
b
ec
o
m
e 
m
o
re
 
v
ar
ie
d
 
–
 
so
m
e 
m
u
lt
ip
li
ca
ti
o
n
 a
n
d
 d
iv
is
io
n
 t
as
k
s 
ar
e 
in
cl
u
d
ed
. 
S
o
m
et
im
es
 t
h
e 
re
ad
er
 n
ee
d
s 
to
 i
d
en
ti
fy
 t
w
o
 o
r 
m
o
re
 n
u
m
b
er
s 
fr
o
m
 v
ar
io
u
s 
p
la
ce
s 
in
 t
h
e 
d
o
cu
m
en
t,
 a
n
d
 t
h
e 
n
u
m
b
er
s 
ar
e 
fr
eq
u
en
tl
y
 e
m
b
ed
d
ed
 i
n
 c
o
m
p
le
x
 d
is
p
la
y
s.
 W
h
il
e 
se
m
an
ti
c 
re
la
ti
o
n
 t
er
m
s 
su
ch
 a
s 
“h
o
w
 m
an
y
” 
o
r 
“c
al
cu
la
te
 
th
e 
d
if
fe
re
n
ce
” 
ar
e 
o
ft
en
 u
se
d
, 
so
m
e 
o
f 
th
e 
ta
sk
s 
re
q
u
ir
e 
th
e 
re
ad
er
 t
o
 m
ak
e 
h
ig
h
er
-o
rd
er
 i
n
fe
re
n
ce
s 
to
 d
et
er
m
in
e 
th
e 
ap
p
ro
p
ri
at
e 
o
p
er
at
io
n
. 
4
 
3
2
6
 t
o
 3
7
5
 
W
it
h
 o
n
e 
ex
ce
p
ti
o
n
, 
th
e 
ta
sk
s 
at
 t
h
is
 l
ev
el
 r
eq
u
ir
e 
th
e 
re
ad
er
 t
o
 p
er
fo
rm
 a
 s
in
g
le
 a
ri
th
m
et
ic
 o
p
er
at
io
n
 w
h
er
e 
ty
p
ic
al
ly
 e
it
h
er
 t
h
e 
q
u
an
ti
ti
es
 o
r 
th
e 
o
p
er
at
io
n
 a
re
 n
o
t 
ea
si
ly
 d
et
er
m
in
ed
. 
T
h
at
 i
s,
 f
o
r 
m
o
st
 o
f 
th
e 
ta
sk
s 
at
 t
h
is
 l
ev
el
, 
th
e 
q
u
es
ti
o
n
 o
r 
d
ir
ec
ti
v
e 
d
o
es
 n
o
t 
p
ro
v
id
e 
a 
se
m
an
ti
c 
re
la
ti
o
n
 t
er
m
 s
u
ch
 a
s 
“h
o
w
 m
an
y
” 
o
r 
“c
al
cu
la
te
 t
h
e 
d
if
fe
re
n
ce
” 
to
 h
el
p
 t
h
e 
re
ad
er
. 
5
 
3
7
6
 t
o
 5
0
0
 
T
h
es
e 
ta
sk
s 
re
q
u
ir
e 
re
ad
er
s 
to
 p
er
fo
rm
 m
u
lt
ip
le
 o
p
er
at
io
n
s 
se
q
u
en
ti
al
ly
, 
an
d
 t
h
ey
 m
u
st
 l
o
ca
te
 f
ea
tu
re
s 
o
f 
th
e 
p
ro
b
le
m
 e
m
b
ed
d
ed
 i
n
 t
h
e 
m
at
er
ia
l 
o
r 
re
ly
 o
n
 b
ac
k
g
ro
u
n
d
 k
n
o
w
le
d
g
e 
to
 d
et
er
m
in
e 
th
e 
q
u
an
ti
ti
es
 o
r 
o
p
er
at
io
n
s 
n
ee
d
ed
. 
S
o
u
rc
e:
 S
ta
ti
st
ic
s 
C
an
ad
a 
(2
0
0
2
).
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Table III-A Sample means for wage equations, by gender and place of birth: 
countries applying a bilingual policy 
Variables Born in country of survey Not born in country of survey 
Males Females Males Females 
Mean   S.D. Mean   S.D. Mean   S.D. Mean   S.D. 
Finland 
wage 
a7 
exper 
prose 
doc 
quant 
lang2 
Number of 
observations 
982256 
12.59 
19.29 
291.72 
298.77 
298.43 
0.51 
 
1104 
2785377 
3.545 
12.879 
41.78 
47.01 
41.41 
0.500 
1038858 
13.11 
18.69 
303.56 
301.23 
291.68 
0.58 
 
1049 
2926830 
3.451 
12.904 
39.17 
44.48 
38.96 
0.591 
1495678 
13.00 
11.68 
282.70 
290.66 
285.37 
0.79 
 
28 
3536005 
2.867 
10.111 
69.39 
58.67 
55.81 
0.418 
 
1314993 
14.44 
9.69 
311.01 
300.56 
289.30 
0.88 
 
16 
3390997 
2.898 
9.075 
59.69 
59.58 
57.57 
0.342 
Norway 
Wage 
a7 
exper 
prose 
doc 
quant 
lang2 
Number of 
observations 
1107591 
12.53 
20.93 
291.68 
306.91 
308.22 
0.8215 
 
1227 
2781348 
4.621 
13.726 
37.35 
44.39 
43.65 
0,38308 
 
1546490 
12.42 
20.36 
302.31 
305.11 
303.03 
0.8324 
 
1241 
3427086 
3.705 
13.265 
36.03 
43.41 
40.58 
0.37367 
 
1936607 
15.92 
16.01 
266.56 
278.25 
287.56 
0.9813 
 
107 
3765607 
8.942 
13.548 
65.42 
77.33 
65.28 
0.13607 
 
2203896 
14.71 
16.55 
286.05 
289.97 
290.04 
0.9740 
 
77 
4019355 
3.769 
10.754 
62.37 
68.34 
58.38 
0.16010 
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Table III-B Sample means for wage equations, by gender and place of birth: 
countries applying a non-bilingual policy 
Variables Born in country of survey        Not born in country of survey 
Males    Females        Males          Females 
Mean      S.D.    Mean        S.D.        Mean       S.D.         Mean      S.D. 
Chile 
wage 
a7 
exper 
prose 
doc 
quant 
lang2 
Number of 
observations 
12960155 
9.04 
22.54 
208.57 
212.88 
203.40 
0.10 
 
1361 
31289941 
4.385 
14.317 
56.116 
55.844 
71.569 
0.296 
 
17550442 
10.47 
19.05 
228.09 
224.11 
211.26 
0.08 
 
873 
36682533 
4.031 
13.376 
50.262 
48.452 
64.172 
0.272 
39025000 
13.63 
14.13 
267.99 
276.48 
281.06 
0.50 
 
8 
50570700 
6.093 
12.357 
52.952 
69.506 
74.126 
0.535 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
 
1 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
 
Czech Republic 
wage 
a7 
exper 
prose 
doc 
quant 
lang2 
Number of 
observations 
2880509 
13.57 
21.75 
274.32 
292.71 
310.20 
0.55 
 
1061 
4422884.2 
4.754 
12.451 
39.326 
49.066 
50.701 
0.498 
 
 
2963418 
13.02 
22.23 
275.41 
286.00 
301.32 
0.58 
 
1245 
4498970 
4.331 
11.864 
37.546 
47.430 
47.657 
0.494 
 
2079200 
10.60 
32.10 
250.11 
270.69 
277.93 
1.00 
 
10 
4174691.3 
1.430 
10.027 
33.613 
37.604 
45.189 
0.000 
 
2107485 
13.07 
27.53 
258.82 
272.48 
267.78 
1.00 
 
10 
4085639.4 
3.369 
11.281 
47.891 
68.465 
64.347 
0.000 
Denmark 
wage 
a7 
exper 
prose 
doc 
quant 
lang2 
Number of 
observations 
4806046 
13.14 
19.13 
278.22 
304.47 
310.80 
0.86 
 
1318 
19880645 
4.051 
13.299 
32.743 
42.036 
40.365 
0.349 
 
9896876 
13.03 
18.96 
283.46 
297.26 
297.90 
0.89 
 
1197 
28032362 
3.893 
12.944 
32.198 
40.577 
39.552 
0.309 
 
7974555 
14.04 
22.30 
259.33 
283.51 
292.40 
0.96 
 
23 
25532464 
3.457 
12.879 
46.675 
59.923 
61.702 
0.209 
 
19440242 
11.83 
23.09 
266.18 
271.71 
281.01 
0.96 
 
23 
37425373 
3.099 
12.979 
39.142 
52.740 
49.656 
0.209 
 
Italy 
wage 
a7 
exper 
prose 
doc 
quant 
lang2 
Number of 
observations 
273315 
12.17 
22.18 
258.56 
258.28 
271.12 
0.32 
 
971 
414803.94 
4.077 
11.701 
53.078 
53.293 
55.567 
0.467 
 
312356 
12.26 
19.29 
268.94 
254.60 
263.08 
0.31 
 
802 
445827.69 
3.889 
11.306 
51.041 
49.885 
51.892 
0.464 
 
274356 
13.50 
17.43 
262.46 
265.01 
279.52 
0.54 
 
28 
426839.80 
4.194 
8.664 
41.934 
44.743 
42.332 
0.508 
 
410619 
12.12 
16.20 
250.92 
241.71 
249.17 
0.76 
 
25 
491194.95 
4.729 
10.275 
55.253 
61.151 
58.619 
0.436 
 
Slovenia 
wage 
a7 
exper 
prose 
doc 
quant 
lang2 
Number of 
observations 
643475 
11.47 
19.19 
230.46 
240.64 
252.04 
0.84 
 
947 
761179.81 
2.844 
11.814 
52.332 
59.646 
64.021 
0.365 
 
542160 
11.77 
18.20 
249.55 
249.63 
257.46 
0.73 
 
904 
643940.61 
2.874 
11.689 
49.802 
56.567 
58.394 
0.444 
 
603367 
10.84 
22.09 
208.65 
212.98 
225.01 
0.97 
 
99 
636767.92 
3.190 
10.599 
60.946 
66.019 
69.251 
0.172 
 
637158 
10.54 
22.07 
218.84 
212.94 
222.69 
0.95 
 
109 
745881.44 
3.242 
9.665 
60.914 
67.370 
64.889 
0.210 
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Table III-B (cont’d) 
Variables Born in country of survey     Not born in country of survey 
Males Females     Males  Females 
Mean  S.D. Mean    S.D.     Mean   S.D.  Mean   S.D. 
Switzerland 
wage 
a7 
exper 
prose 
doc 
quant 
lang2 
Number of 
observations 
1567338 
13.86 
18.79 
285.16 
292.36 
303.67 
0.9846 
 
324 
3565222.8 
2.860 
12.820 
38.957 
39.293 
43.996 
0.12345 
1866260 
13.20 
19.65 
282.58 
283.11 
288.88 
0.9883 
 
343 
3863863.8 
5.352 
13.801 
38.746 
39.722 
41.973 
0.10752 
 
1601025 
12.12 
26.45 
245.54 
257.36 
262.19 
0.9052 
 
116 
3615315.4 
4.652 
13.440 
53.354 
54.155 
59.373 
0.29425 
 
1645139 
11.10 
24.76 
246.63 
246.00 
249.15 
0.9333 
 
105 
3689831.4 
3.785 
12.360 
58.898 
58.454 
60.239 
0.25064 
 
Hungary 
wage 
a7 
exper 
prose 
doc 
quant 
lang2 
Number of 
observations 
20601578 
12.80 
19.64 
241.89 
255.45 
278.04 
0.19 
 
752 
37899973 
7.698 
13.481 
38.27 
48.97 
48.27 
0.391 
 
19202275 
12.93 
19.56 
253.61 
256.61 
278.95 
0.26 
 
763 
36963758 
6.949 
12.728 
37.78 
48.62 
48.57 
0.438 
 
27951944 
13.67 
24.00 
236.11 
250.07 
265.91 
0.50 
 
6 
43043159 
3.559 
15.887 
48.34 
50.21 
53.32 
0.548 
 
13948922 
15.25 
21.92 
282.48 
277.43 
267.40 
1.00 
 
12 
32496006 
3.980 
12.471 
36.63 
44.14 
89.33 
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Table IV-A Estimated coefficients, human capital wage equations: countries applying 
a bilingual policy 
(Note: only cases presenting positive adjusted R2 are presented in these tables. For details about cases not 
presented here, please contact the author) 
 
Finland 
Gender Independent 
variable 
Dependent variable: Natural logarithm of annual wage rate (quintile) 
(1) 
Parameter 
estimate 
t-statistic 
H0: β =0 
Prob> 
|t | 
(2) 
Parameter 
estimate 
t-statistic 
H0: β =0 
Prob> 
|t | 
(3) 
Parameter 
estimate 
t-statistic 
H0: β =0 
Prob> 
|t | 
Born in country of survey 
Men 
 
 
 
 
Intercept 
a7 
exper 
prose 
doc 
quant 
lang2 
Adjusted R
2 
9.446 
0.106 
0.051 
 
 
 
 
0.122 
39.746 
7.103 
12.279 
0.000 
0.000 
0.000 
10.486 
0.124 
0.046 
-0.013 
0.007 
0.002 
 
0.136 
24.663 
7.542 
10.134 
-4.391 
2.143 
0.495 
0.000 
0.000 
0.000 
0.000 
0.032 
0.621 
10.366 
0.131 
0.045 
-0.013 
0.008 
0.001 
-0.179 
0.137 
23.999 
7.680 
9.785 
-4.170 
2.209 
0.393 
-1.540 
0.000 
0.000 
0.000 
0.000 
0.027 
0.694 
0.124 
Dependent variable mean: 11.76, Number of observations: 1104. 
Women Intercept 
a7 
exper 
prose 
doc 
quant 
lang2 
Adjusted R
2
 
9.644 
0.059 
0.055 
 
 
 
 
0.125 
35.732 
3.522 
12.269 
0.000 
0.000 
0.000 
11.253 
0.071 
0.047 
-0.013 
0.003 
0.004 
 
0.138 
20.695 
4.044 
9.001 
-3.787 
0.872 
1.119 
0.000 
0.000 
0.000 
0.000 
0.383 
0.263 
11.289 
0.069 
0.047 
-0.013 
0.003 
0.004 
0.070 
0.137 
20.663 
3.831 
8.991 
-3.821 
0.833 
1.147 
0.693 
0.000 
0.000 
0.000 
0.000 
0.405 
0.252 
0.488 
Dependent variable mean: 11.45, Number of observations: 1049. 
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Table IV-A (cont’d) 
orway 
Gender Independent 
variable 
Dependent variable: Natural logarithm of annual wage rate (quintile) 
(1) 
Parameter 
estimate 
t-statistic 
H0: β =0 
Prob> 
|t | 
(2) 
Parameter 
estimate 
t-statistic 
H0: β =0 
Prob> 
|t | 
(3) 
Parameter 
estimate 
t-statistic 
H0: β =0 
Prob> 
|t | 
Born in country of survey 
Men 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Intercept 
a7 
exper 
prose 
doc 
quant 
lang2 
Adjusted R
2 
10.816 
0.062 
0.040 
 
 
 
 
0.112 
66.675 
6.446 
12.292 
0.000 
0.000 
0.000 
 
10.963 
0.051 
0.034 
-0.011 
0.000 
0.011 
 
0.127 
29.220 
5.007 
9.465 
-3.595 
-0.135 
3.859 
 
0.000 
0.000 
0.000 
0.000 
0.892 
0.000 
10.976 
0.051 
0.035 
-0.011 
0.000 
0.011 
0.088 
0.127 
29.217 
4.989 
9.444 
-3.633 
-0.151 
3.812 
0.725 
0.000 
0.000 
0.000 
0.000 
0.880 
0.000 
0.469 
Dependent variable mean: 12.42, Number of observations: 1227. 
Women Intercept 
a7 
exper 
prose 
doc 
quant 
lang2 
Adjusted R
2
 
11.419 
0.036 
0.022 
 
 
 
 
0.024 
51.626 
2.517 
5.603 
0.000 
0.012 
0.000 
12.153 
0.040 
0.017 
-0.001 
-0.006 
0.005 
 
0.025 
23.448 
2.673 
3.793 
-0.366 
-1.516 
1.324 
0.000 
0.008 
0.000 
0.714 
0.130 
0.186 
12.173 
0.039 
0.018 
-0.002 
-0.006 
0.005 
0.164 
0.025 
23.474 
2.559 
3.924 
-0.436 
-1.590 
1.334 
1.073 
0.000 
0.011 
0.000 
0.663 
0.112 
0.183 
0.284 
Dependent variable mean: 12.31, Number of observations: 1241 
Not born in country of survey 
Men 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Intercept 
a7 
exper 
prose 
doc 
quant 
lang2 
Adjusted R
2 
11.516 
0.037 
0.028 
 
 
 
 
0.003 
15.840 
1.298 
1.467 
0.000 
0.197 
0.146 
10.790 
0.024 
0.024 
0.001 
-0.015 
0.017 
 
0.004 
9.823 
0.770 
1.233 
0.110 
-1.456 
1.647 
0.000 
0.443 
0.220 
0.913 
0.148 
0.103 
12.217 
0.029 
0.026 
0.001 
-0.015 
0.016 
-1.497 
0.005 
6.988 
0.928 
1.346 
0.122 
-1.435 
1.586 
-1.049 
0.000 
0.356 
0.181 
0.903 
0.154 
0.116 
0.297 
Dependent variable mean: 12.56, Number of observations: 107. 
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Table IV-B Estimated coefficients, human capital wage equations: countries applying 
a non-bilingual policy 
(Note: Only cases presenting positive adjusted R2 are presented in these tables. For details about cases not 
presented here, please contact the author) 
 
Chile 
Gender Independent 
variable 
Dependent variable: Natural logarithm of annual wage rate (quintile) 
(1) 
Parameter 
estimate 
t-statistic 
H0: β =0 
Prob> 
|t | 
(2) 
Parameter 
estimate 
t-statistic 
H0: β =0 
Prob> 
|t | 
(3) 
Parameter 
estimate 
t-statistic 
H0: β =0 
Prob> 
|t | 
Born in country of survey 
Men 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Intercept 
a7 
exper 
prose 
doc 
quant 
lang2 
Adjusted R
2 
12.835 
0.138 
0.015 
 
 
 
 
0.085 
69.509 
10.915 
3.781 
0.000 
0.000 
0.000 
12.492 
0.107 
0.015 
0.001 
0.001 
0.001 
 
0.087 
41.889 
6.032 
3.726 
0.243 
0.403 
0.384 
0.000 
0.000 
0.000 
0.808 
0.687 
0.701 
12.485 
0.108 
0.015 
0.001 
0.001 
0.001 
-0.063 
0.087 
41.780 
6.035 
3.746 
0.280 
0.373 
0.384 
-0.402 
0.000 
0.000 
0.000 
0.779 
0.710 
0.701 
0.688 
 
Dependent variable mean: 14.41, Number of observations: 1361. 
Women Intercept 
a7 
exper 
prose 
doc 
quant 
lang2 
Adjusted R
2
 
12.073 
0.154 
0.036 
 
 
 
 
0.069 
41.692 
7.821 
6.065 
0.000 
0.000 
0.000 
11.454 
0.094 
0.036 
0.004 
-0.002 
0.004 
 
0.078 
22.730 
3.570 
6.141 
0.997 
-0.456 
0.941 
0.000 
0.000 
0.000 
0.319 
0.648 
0.347 
11.490 
0.088 
0.037 
0.005 
-0.003 
0.003 
0.336 
0.079 
22.776 
3.313 
6.150 
1.061 
-0.497 
0.914 
1.300 
 
0.000 
0.000 
0.000 
0.289 
0.619 
0.361 
0.194 
Dependent variable mean: 14.37, Number of observations: 873. 
 
Czech Republic 
Gender Independent 
variable 
Dependent variable: Natural logarithm of annual wage rate (quintile) 
(1) 
Parameter 
estimate 
t-statistic 
H0: β =0 
Prob> 
|t | 
(2) 
Parameter 
estimate 
t-statistic 
H0: β =0 
Prob> 
|t | 
(3) 
Parameter 
estimate 
t-statistic 
H0: β =0 
Prob> 
|t | 
Born in country of survey 
Men 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Intercept 
a7 
exper 
prose 
doc 
quant 
lang2 
Adjusted R
2 
12.192 
0.026 
0.014 
 
 
 
 
0.005 
45.991 
1.824 
2.474 
0.000 
0.069 
0.014 
12.685 
0.025 
0.008 
-0.009 
-0.012 
0.018 
 
0.027 
23.782 
1.729 
1.356 
-2.392 
-3.134 
5.036 
0.000 
0.084 
0.175 
0.017 
0.002 
0.000 
12.732 
0.023 
0.008 
-0.009 
-0.012 
0.018 
0.108 
0.026 
23.715 
1.586 
1.404 
-2.469 
-3.167 
5.073 
0.780 
0.000 
0.113 
0.160 
0.014 
0.002 
0.000 
0.436 
Dependent variable mean: 12.84, Number of observations: 1061. 
Women Intercept 
a7 
exper 
prose 
doc 
quant 
lang2 
Adjusted R
2
 
12.275 
0.032 
-0.004 
 
 
 
 
0.004 
40.892 
1.967 
-0.731 
0.000 
0.049 
0.465 
13.538 
0.031 
-0.012 
-0.010 
-0.014 
0.019 
 
0.024 
22.796 
1.869 
-1.986 
-2.575 
-3.338 
4.746 
0.000 
0.062 
0.047 
0.010 
0.001 
0.000 
13.541 
0.029 
-0.012 
-0.010 
-0.014 
0.019 
0.149 
0.024 
22.802 
1.760 
-1.845 
-2.634 
-3.360 
4.755 
1.078 
0.000 
0.079 
0.065 
0.009 
0.001 
0.000 
0.281 
Dependent variable mean: 12.60, Number of observations: 1245. 
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Table IV-B (cont’d) 
Denmark 
Gender Independent 
variable 
Dependent variable: Natural logarithm of annual wage rate (quintile) 
(1) 
Parameter 
estimate 
t-statistic 
H0: β =0 
Prob> 
|t | 
(2) 
Parameter 
estimate 
t-statistic 
H0: β =0 
Prob> 
|t | 
(3) 
Parameter 
estimate 
t-statistic 
H0: β =0 
Prob> 
|t | 
Born in country of survey 
Men 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Intercept 
a7 
exper 
prose 
doc 
quant 
lang2 
Adjusted R
2 
10.529 
0.080 
0.045 
 
 
 
 
0.125 
58.758 
7.184 
13.215 
0.000 
0.000 
0.000 
11.271 
0.084 
0.045 
-0.015 
0.009 
0.002 
 
0.133 
27.542 
7.117 
12.075 
-3.986 
2.335 
0.736 
0.000 
0.000 
0.000 
0.000 
0.020 
0.462 
11.268 
0.083 
0.045 
-0.015 
0.009 
0.002 
0.032 
0.132 
27.513 
7.052 
11.751 
-3.985 
2.312 
0.752 
0.223 
0.000 
0.000 
0.000 
0.000 
0.021 
0.452 
0.824 
Dependent variable mean: 12.43, Number of observations: 1318. 
Women Intercept 
a7 
exper 
prose 
doc 
quant 
lang2 
Adjusted R
2
 
11.318 
0.048 
0.027 
 
 
 
 
0.021 
39.978 
2.739 
5.139 
0.000 
0.006 
0.000 
12.773 
0.064 
0.027 
-0.011 
0.008 
-0.003 
 
0.025 
19.817 
3.459 
4.677 
-2.042 
1.527 
-0.729 
0.000 
0.001 
0.000 
0.041 
0.127 
0.466 
12.698 
0.063 
0.030 
-0.013 
0.008 
-0.003 
0.555 
0.029 
19.717 
3.452 
5.060 
-2.404 
1.504 
-0.612 
2.423 
0.000 
0.001 
0.000 
0.016 
0.133 
0.540 
0.016 
Dependent variable mean: 12.45, Number of observations: 1197.  
 
Hungary 
Gender Independent 
variable 
Dependent variable: Natural logarithm of annual wage rate (quintile) 
(1) 
Parameter 
estimate 
t-statistic 
H0: β =0 
Prob> 
|t | 
(2) 
Parameter 
estimate 
t-statistic 
H0: β =0 
Prob> |t 
| 
(3) 
Parameter 
estimate 
t-statistic 
H0: β =0 
Prob> 
|t | 
Born in country of survey 
Men 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Intercept 
a7 
exper 
prose 
doc 
quant 
lang2 
Adjusted R
2 
10.984 
0.057 
0.034 
 
 
 
 
0.015 
27.442 
3.129 
3.292 
0.000 
0.002 
0.001 
10.299 
0.046 
0.028 
-0.021 
0.002 
0.019 
 
0.037 
11.522 
2.521 
2.539 
-3.183 
0.413 
3.458 
0.000 
0.012 
0.011 
0.002 
0.680 
0.001 
10.476 
0.043 
0.030 
-0.021 
0.002 
0.019 
0.788 
0.043 
11.726 
2.325 
2.682 
-3.237 
0.305 
3.417 
2.529 
0.000 
0.020 
0.007 
0.001 
0.761 
0.001 
0.012 
Dependent variable mean: 12.39, Number of observations: 752. 
Women Intercept 
a7 
exper 
prose 
doc 
quant 
lang2 
Adjusted R
2
 
11.517 
0.024 
0.014 
 
 
 
 
0.000 
27.629 
1.203 
1.347 
0.000 
0.229 
0.178 
10.129 
0.011 
0.015 
-0.005 
-0.005 
0.015 
 
0.011 
10.147 
0.534 
1.323 
-0.758 
-0.948 
2.810 
0.000 
0.593 
0.186 
0.448 
0.343 
0.005 
10.199 
0.012 
0.018 
-0.006 
-0.005 
0.015 
0.481 
0.013 
10.221 
0.606 
1.591 
-0.857 
-0.961 
2.757 
1.689 
0.000 
0.545 
0.112 
0.391 
0.337 
0.006 
0.092 
Dependent variable mean: 12.10, Number of observations: 763. 
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Table IV-B (cont’d) 
Italy 
Gender Independent 
variable 
Dependent variable: Natural logarithm of annual wage rate (quintile) 
(1) 
Parameter 
estimate 
t-statistic 
H0: β =0 
Prob> 
|t | 
(2) 
Parameter 
estimate 
t-statistic 
H0: β =0 
Prob> 
|t | 
(3) 
Parameter 
estimate 
t-statistic 
H0: β =0 
Prob> 
|t | 
Born in country of survey 
Men 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Intercept 
a7 
exper 
prose 
doc 
quant 
lang2 
Adjusted R
2 
10.257 
0.044 
0.018 
 
 
 
 
0.014 
42.300 
3.123 
3.586 
0.000 
0.002 
0.000 
10.090 
0.036 
0.015 
-0.007 
-0.002 
0.010 
 
0.026 
29.367 
2.226 
3.010 
-2.682 
-0.642 
2.895 
0.000 
0.026 
0.003 
0.007 
0.521 
0.004 
10.086 
0.037 
0.015 
-0.007 
-0.002 
0.010 
-0.027 
0.025 
29.303 
2.217 
3.007 
-2.658 
-0.655 
2.898 
-0.226 
0.000 
0.027 
0.003 
0.008 
0.513 
0.004 
0.821 
Dependent variable mean: 11.18, Number of observations: 971. 
Women Intercept 
a7 
exper 
prose 
doc 
quant 
lang2 
Adjusted R
2
 
10.563 
0.015 
0.013 
 
 
 
 
0.002 
30.121 
0.733 
1.795 
0.000 
0.464 
0.073 
10.850 
0.014 
0.008 
-0.009 
-0.008 
0.016 
 
0.017 
21.998 
0.591 
1.107 
-2.364 
-1.599 
3.655 
0.000 
0.555 
0.269 
0.018 
0.110 
0.000 
10.863 
0.012 
0.008 
-0.009 
-0.008 
0.016 
0.046 
0.016 
21.923 
0.509 
1.116 
-2.373 
-1.603 
3.660 
0.289 
0.000 
0.611 
0.265 
0.018 
0.109 
0.000 
0.773 
Dependent variable mean: 11.00, Number of observations: 802. 
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Table IV-B (cont’d) 
Switzerland (Italian-speaking) 
Gender Independent 
variable 
Dependent variable: Natural logarithm of annual wage rate (quintile) 
(1) 
Parameter 
estimate 
t-statistic 
H0: β =0 
Prob> 
|t | 
(2) 
Parameter 
estimate 
t-statistic 
H0: β =0 
Prob> 
|t | 
(3) 
Parameter 
estimate 
t-statistic 
H0: β =0 
Prob> 
|t | 
Born in country of survey 
Men 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Intercept 
a7 
exper 
prose 
doc 
quant 
lang2 
Adjusted R
2 
9.754 
0.079 
0.041 
 
 
 
 
0.049 
14.325 
1.860 
4.312 
0.000 
0.064 
0.000 
10.387 
0.093 
0.038 
-0.005 
-0.001 
0.004 
 
0.044 
9.896 
2.022 
3.794 
-0.873 
-0.204 
0.676 
0.000 
0.044 
0.000 
0.383 
0.838 
0.500 
9.207 
0.083 
0.036 
-0.006 
-0.001 
0.004 
1.442 
0.048 
7.090 
1.791 
3.549 
-0.907 
-0.223 
0.696 
1.538 
0.000 
0.074 
0.000 
0.365 
0.824 
0.487 
0.125 
Dependent variable mean: 11.61, Number of observations: 324. 
Women Intercept 
a7 
exper 
prose 
doc 
quant 
lang2 
Adjusted R
2
 
10.543 
0.017 
0.025 
 
 
 
 
0.009 
19.201 
0.573 
2.204 
0.000 
0.567 
2.204 
13.125 
0.027 
0.019 
-0.015 
0.004 
0.002 
 
0.024 
10.633 
0.906 
1.535 
-2.079 
0.438 
0.303 
0.000 
0.366 
0.126 
0.038 
0.662 
0.762 
13.142 
0.027 
0.019 
-0.015 
0.004 
0.002 
-0.018 
0.021 
7.844 
0.905 
1.530 
-2.060 
0.434 
0.303 
-0.014 
0.000 
0.366 
0.127 
0.040 
0.664 
0.762 
0.988 
Dependent variable mean: 11.25, Number of observations: 343. 
Not born in country of survey 
Men 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Intercept 
a7 
exper 
prose 
doc 
quant 
lang2 
Adjusted R
2 
11.578 
-0.016 
0.009 
 
 
 
 
-0.011 
13.367 
-0.355 
0.546 
0.000 
0.723 
0.586 
12.154 
0.033 
0.010 
-0.027 
0.019 
0.002 
 
0.032 
10.358 
0.593 
0.642 
-2.717 
1.901 
0.261 
0.000 
0.554 
0.522 
0.008 
0.060 
0.795 
11.829 
0.028 
0.008 
-0.027 
0.018 
0.002 
0.624 
0.032 
9.680 
0.507 
0.490 
-2.699 
1.816 
0.279 
0.958 
0.000 
0.614 
0.625 
0.008 
0.072 
0.781 
0.340 
Dependent variable mean: 11.61, Number of observations: 116. 
Women Intercept 
a7 
exper 
prose 
doc 
quant 
lang2 
Adjusted R
2 
8.643 
0.052 
0.072 
 
 
 
 
0.098 
7.921 
0.782 
3.527 
0.000 
0.436 
0.001 
8.586 
0.043 
0.074 
0.009 
0.001 
-0.010 
 
0.078 
6.162 
0.543 
3.517 
0.800 
0.118 
-0.756 
0.000 
0.588 
0.001 
0.426 
0.907 
0.451 
8.381 
0.040 
0.074 
0.009 
0.002 
-0.010 
0.228 
0.069 
5.152 
0.500 
3.485 
0.807 
0.127 
-0.762 
0.247 
0.000 
0.618 
0.001 
0.422 
0.899 
0.448 
0.806 
Dependent variable mean: 11.01, Number of observations: 105. 
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Table B Current external settings of countries in Study I  
(economic and financial dependency) 
 Primary Trade Partners (Export-Import) Primary Bilateral Donor 
Angola US-South Corea Portugal 
Benin Nigeria-China France 
Botswana European Free Trade Association (EFTA)-
Southern African Customs Union (SACU) 
U.S. 
Burkina Faso Ghana-France France 
Burundi Switzerland-Kenya U.S. 
Cameroon Spain-France France 
Central Africa Belgium-France France 
Comoros US-France France 
Congo-Brazzaville China-France France 
Congo-Kinshasa Belgium-South Africa U.S. 
Cote d’Ivoire France-France France 
Egypt Italy-US U.S. 
Gabon US-France France 
Gambia India-China Japan 
Ghana Netherlands-Nigeria Japan 
Guinea-Bissau India-Senegal Italy 
Kenya Uganda-UAE U.S. 
Lesotho US-Hong Kong Ireland 
Liberia Denmark-South Korea U.S. 
Libya Italy-Italy France 
Mali China-France France 
Mauritania Japan-France Japan 
Morocco France-France France 
Mozambique Netherlands-South Africa U.S. 
Namibia South Africa-South Africa Germany 
Niger France-France France 
Nigeria US-China U.S. 
Rwanda Indonesia-Kenya U.S. 
Senegal India-France France 
Sierra Leone Belgium-Germany U.K. 
South Africa US-Germany U.K. 
Swaziland South Africa-South Africa Netherlands 
Tanzania India-South Africa U.K. 
Togo Burkina Faso-China France 
Tunisia France-France France 
Zambia South Africa-South Africa U.K. 
Zimbabwe South Africa-South Africa U.K. 
Sources:  
CIA. (2006). The World Fact Book 2006. URL: [http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/], (June 18, 
2006). 
OECD. (2006). Aid Statistics, Recipient Aid Charts. URL:  
[http://www.oecd.org/countrylist/0,2578,en_2649_34447_25602317_1_1_1_1,00.html], (June 18, 2006).  
WTO. (2006). Statistics Country Profiles March 2006. URL: [http://stat.wto.org/CountryProfiles/], (June 18, 
2006). 
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